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Abstract 
This thesis explores security planning policy in Canada.  It provides a historical overview of 
the securing of cities from the threat of mass violence and demonstrates how violence affects 
urban populations and the form and function of cities as a result.  A purposefully stampeded 
case study approach is used to determine the state of security planning in Canada and 
compare selected cities to a benchmark case of Washington D.C.  This thesis contributes to 
the understanding of security planning within Canada in the post September 11, 2001 world 
and offers insight into strategies used in defense of urban areas  The review of literature and 
discussion sections also provide a critical assessment of security planning which has occurred 
in the time following WWII, the IRA crisis in Britain the FLQ crisis in Quebec and the 
terrorist attacks in London and New York in the past decade. Research questions are 
answered through a case study and literature analysis approach.  Results demonstrate that 
American responses to the threat of terrorism have motivated various governmental agencies 
to create policy and physical responses to respond to the threat of terrorism.  This thesis 
concludes that Canada, in comparison to the United States and other areas has done little to 
secure itself against terrorist attack and more specifically that urban planning and 
municipalities in Canada have done little to integrate anti-terrorism security planning into 
their planning policy.  It is argued that a lack of federal mandates, a lack of motivation and 
education in planning spheres as well as funding issues are contributing factors. 
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Glossary of Terms 
Active Security:  refers to a security element’s ability to be able to react or analyses the area 
it is protecting and either respond, or relay information to response personnel. 
Anti-terrorism:  Refers primarily to defensive measures that can be taken to protect people 
and property from terrorist attacks and can involve activities including growth management, 
comprehensive planning and micro-level urban design activities (Schneider, 2003). 
Community planner, planner, urban planner:  those professionals involved in physical 
land use and transportation planning and organization of urban areas 
Corporate Security:  security measures aimed at protecting the resilience of a system and 
measures taken to prevent acts of crime on the premises of corporate property. In the case of 
public sector corporations it also involves handling the safe delivery of services to the public  
Counter Terrorism:  Refers primarily to offensive measures taken to combat terrorism and 
us generally the territory of agencies such as the FBI, CIA, CSIS, RCMP (Schneider, 2003). 
Mass Violence:  attacks by an individual or group which kill a disproportionately large 
amount of individuals 
Passive Security:  refers to devices and designs which prevent vehicles, people or ordinates 
from entering or striking an area by way of stationary infrastructure and barriers. These 
security devices are generally nonreactive and do not involve any human components beyond 
their installation. 
Terrorism:  human acts of violence or destruction aimed at causing loss of life, economic 
damage, physical damage or psychological damage to a nation or group of people. 
CP: Comprehensive Plan  
 
  xi 
CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency   
GTA: Greater Toronto Area  
OP:  Official Plan  
PPS: Provincial Policy Statement 
ROP: Regional Official Plan 
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Preface 
My own motivation for conducting this research is twofold.  It is of great interest to me and 
is relevant to my current occupation as an Army Officer with the Canadian Forces.  The 
second portion of my motivation comes from a genuine want to make Canada a safer and 
better place to live and out of a profound believe that fear and the threat of violence should 
not prevent people from going about their daily lives and acting as they so choose.  I realize 
my bias and ideological stance at the beginning of this research but I believe that it does not 
impair my judgment or the validity of my conclusions but rather further motivates me to 
conduct rigorous and useful research.  As the old adages of the boy scouts and army state 
“simper paratus or be prepared” and “It’s better to have it and not need it, than to need it and 













Chapter 1 Introduction 
“[C]ontemporary security as a concept, practice and commodity is undergoing a rescaling, 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, with previously international security concerns 
penetrating all levels of governance. Security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and 
personal: security is coming home” (Coaffee and Wood, 2006 p 504).   
 
The issue of security in relation to terrorism and mass violence is one that is becoming 
necessary in today’s urbanizing Canada.  However, this has not been well researched in the 
Canadian context and the following thesis provides a foundation for security planning and 
anti-terrorism research, integrating it with traditional urban planning.  Many authors have 
determined that terrorism is becoming ever more local and that civilian targets are being 
threatened by acts of mass violence (Axworthy et al. 2006, Coaffee, 2009).  Contemporary 
urban planning has not traditionally focused on the issues of security planning and anti-
terrorism in cities.  Planners, as a profession, have largely focused on their traditional roles 
within their municipal, regional and provincial structures with little communication to one 
another on the subject of security. While it is argued that local level security planning has the 
ability to create safer and prosperous environments for residents it is not clear how or if this 
has been accepted in Canadian cities.  Critical analysis of the Canadian situation as well as 
extensive background context will be provided in the following research.  It will illuminate 
the issues of security planning within Canada and compare the policies and practices in 
selected Canadian cities to that of a North American city that has incorporated extensive 
security considerations in its planning - Washington D.C..  In order to begin the analysis of 
planning and terrorism a sound definition of what is to be studied must first be determined.  
This will set the scope of the research.  For the purposes of this research terrorism will be 
defined as human acts of violence or destruction aimed at causing loss of life, economic 
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damage, physical damage or psychological damage to a nation or group of people.  Security 
Planning for the purpose of this research will therefore focus on preventing or mitigating 
terrorist attacks. It will address the events associated with low frequency high casualty-
destruction scenarios and as such a long period of time may pass before defenses and 
preparedness strategies are tested however the usefulness of these tools can be invaluable, 
should an event occur.  This research will also address the roles of the traditional urban 
planner and security planner respectively examining their roles in planning strategies to 
prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks in urban areas.  It will examine how the planner can 
implement built form changes and provide advice to other security practitioners.   
1.1 Goals and Objectives 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the landscape of urban areas across 
North America (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Not only was there extreme physical damage in 
New York City and at the Pentagon but the widespread economic, social, cultural and policy 
aftershocks permeated across the continent.  Canada was no exception.  This event 
demonstrated that Canada may be ill prepared to deal with the threats presented by terrorism.  
Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, Dr. Arthur L. Fallick and Kelly Ross acknowledged this well at the 
2006 Urban Economic Forum and in their working paper where they stated:  
“Our cities are at the forefront of the impact of threats and attacks, but they are ill equipped 
to respond effectively. There is limited redundancy in the infrastructure, support systems are 
too centralized, and risk assessment and prevention strategies are fragmented. The delicate 
balance between individual self-reliance and dependency is threatened when the power goes 
out, the water quality gets tainted, or the transportation system becomes paralyzed” 
(Axworthy et al, 2006 p 9).  
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The discussion at the 2006 World Urban Forum (WUF) and the work of other security and 
terrorism professionals and academics confirms that Canadian cities are at risk of being 
targeted for major terrorist attacks which are aimed at killing mass a amount of civilians 
(Axworthy et al. 2006; Coaffee and Wood, 2006: Chenoweth and Clarke, 2010).  Axworthy 
and his collogues conclude that “Cities should be the locus for more integrated precaution, 
prevention and risk assessment. Preventive, Adaptive and Human Security provide direction 
for the stewardship of scarce resources to build capacity at the community level and enhance 
livability” (Axworthy et al. 2006 p 25).   
Municipalities and regional governments are in a unique position to protect their urban 
population via policy changes and urban form augmentations which can potentially mitigate 
the effects of terrorism, deter it from occurring and generally better prepare cities for the 
possibility of terrorism, mass violence and mass causality scenarios.  As Clarke and 
Chenoweth (2010 p 495) state: “high-impact/low-probability events such as terrorist attacks 
demand immediate and sustained national responses. In a federal system, national responses 
are only as effective as their implementation through state and local governments.” (Coaffee 
and Wood, 2009 p504) 
Traditionally, security planning for major man-made disasters such as a terrorist attack has 
been outside of the scope of traditional urban planning.  However, it is argued that planning 
can have a profound impact on the development of policy and infrastructure which can help 
to address this problem.  Similarly to how many other urban issues such as transportation has 
been addressed it is my belief that security can also be addressed in a similar manner.  Many 
cities now have transportation master plans to supplement their official plan.  My hope is that 
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security planning can be treated in a similar way in order to create a safer urban environment 
for residents and visitors of cities.   
1.2 Purpose Statement 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the state of security and anti-terrorism planning in 
Canadian cities and explore its potential influences on community form and character in 
Canadian cities.  It will examine how planners can implement built form aimed at preventing 
and mitigating terrorist attacks and examine how the planner can act as an urban expert 
providing information and advice to others in the security planning field.  It also serves as an 
education tool bridging the gap in knowledge many planners have with respect to security 
planning.  The study will explore the following questions: 
1. How can planning contribute to the security of urban areas?   
2. What is the current security planning landscape in Canada?   
3. How do current Canadian practices compare with other standards? 
4. What effects has terrorism and security threats following 2001 had on Canadian 
planning policy and how can urban planners help to secure cities against terrorism?   
Municipal and regional level planning will be the focus of study here in order to develop an 
understanding of its potential contribution to the overall security of cities and how security 
planning can occur at the municipal level in a meaningful way.  The topic will be looked at 
through an urban-Canadian lens in order to determine the landscape of local security 
planning in Canada and what Canadian community planners can do in order to mitigate the 
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effects of terrorist activity in urban areas and how that has impacted the urban form we see in 
Canadian cities today. 
The research questions will be operationalized by reviewing current planning documents 
from selected major cities around the country and by conducting an extensive literature 
review of the most up-to-date and relevant data published material available.  An analysis of 
current planning documents will lead to a better understanding of the state of security 
planning in Canada and it will explore how terrorism and security is perceived and treated by 
government and private institutions. Critical literature review along with policy analysis will 
facilitate an evaluation of the security landscape in Canada, how policies have impacted the 
built environment, and contribute to recommendations informed by the comparative 
assessment.   
This thesis examines the planning driven changes in security planning post September 11, 
2001. Recognizing that there are many facets to the issues of planning for terrorism this 
thesis narrows its scope to examine how planners and planning can prevent and mitigate 
terrorist attacks in urban areas.  It should be noted that disaster management while discussed 
in the context of the aim of this work is not the primary issue being investigated nor are 
defense, police or foreign policy changes being investigated.  While important in the overll 
security of a nation the focus remains on urban planning and the local scale changes which 
can be used to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks.  
The thesis is organized as follows.  The literature review begins with a historical review of 
the affects of violence in cities and its affect on urban form.  It then moves on to discuss 
contemporary terrorist attacks and how they affected city form.  Management practices are 
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then examined as well as the role of planning in defending urban areas from the threat of 
terrorism.  Policy review is then conducted where federal, provincial and municipal 
government documents are examined and discussed.  The results and findings of the thesis 
are then presented in the form of case studies which are compared to the model of 
Washington D.C. which has proven itself to be an archetype of anti-terrorism planning in 
North America (Schneider, 2004).  Finally, discussion surrounding the case study cities 
occurs including comparison to one another and to the Washington D.C. Archetype.  The 
literature review as well as discussion sections of the thesis demonstrate how planning can 
contribute to the security of urban areas.  Additional information regarding this question is 
found in appendix A.  The second research question is answered in the case study and 
discussion sections with additional information on how anti-terror design is being 
operationalized in Appendix A. The third research question is answered in the case studies of 
the purposefully sampled Canadian cities and finally the last research question is answered in 
the comparison of each case study to that of the archetype of Washington D.C.      
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Chapter 2 Literature review  
The Following literature review examines the historical evolution of security and its 
connection with urban planning.  It begins with a historical analysis of the effects of violence 
on population and urban form using the case study of London during WWII.  The literature 
review moves onto describe the effects which terrorism and mass violence has had in the post 
WWII era and how the events of campaigns of violence can affect populations and the 
architecture and form of cities using the Irish Republican Army crisis in Britain as an 
example.  Responses to mass violence are described including the defensive dispersal 
movement which followed WWII. It then describes the choice of targets by terrorists in 
contemporary cities highlighting dense urban areas and sky scrapers as targets.  A typology 
of terrorist attacks is provided with examples of the various types of attacks which have 
occurred around the world.  Using the FEMA risk management series as a foundation as well 
as academic literature, the typology of urban interventions is discussed as well as the 
systematic approach which security plans are taking today in order to better defend urban 
areas.  Graphic examples are utilized to demonstrate how these technological and site 
specific alterations to cities affect its form, function and populations.  Finally the creation and 
adoption of security plans are examined and reactions to security planning are discussed 
including the debate on aesthetics, accessibility and the psychological affect which security 
planning is having on urban populations.  With the context of security and anti-terrorism 
planning established the literature review examines how planners have considered security 
and what has changed in literature and practice following September 11, 2001.  Practices and 
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standards from selected cities are compared and contrasted developing a picture of the 
current state of security planning in Canada.        
2.1 Defensive Cities 
Cities of the past were often a product of the safety that agglomeration created.  
Concentrating people in one area made it much easier to defend that area.  While a few 
individuals living in the hinterland would likely not become a target from marauders of the 
past, their ability to defend themselves from such threats was poor.  Thus, one of the 
attractions of cities is that they provide a safer environment and are better equipped and able 
to defend themselves.  However the agglomeration of people also tends to create more 
attractive targets as well.  Yet the positive aspect of agglomeration outweighs this potential.  
As Mumford writes “the power of massed numbers in itself gave the city a superiority over 
the thinly populated widely scattered villages, and served as an incentive to further growth” 
(Mumford 1960, p 291).  This effect is what Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) call ‘the safe harbor 
effect.’ What is most notable and important about the safe harbor effect and the 
agglomeration of people into cities is the scaled advantage of physical combat in war 
(Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002).  While the safe harbor effect has military, policing and political 
advantages it also offers an agglomeration of people which has a profound effect on business 
and urban form in the city.   
The agglomeration of people in the past allowed them to congregate and erect defense 
structures such as keeps and walls.  While walls may not play as critical a role in the defense 
of cities today, they were a critical feature of the past.  The main reason for their construction 
was to reduce the effects of scaled advantage in combat.  A smaller force of defenders with 
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the aid of fortifications could more easily fight a larger force of combatants.  This is 
especially true considering the importance of scaled advantage in war throughout the ages.  
In recent years the significant military figures including Colin Powell, former four star 
general and American Statesman have argued the need for overwhelming force especially in 
fighting in urban environments (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002). Carl von Clausewitz a military 
theorist and Prussian soldier from the late 17th early 19th century wrote that “superiority of 
numbers is the most important factor in the result of a combat” (von Clausewitz, 1874 p31) 
This theory of scaled advantage demonstrates how the agglomeration of people can be used 
as a defensive tool (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002).  The agglomeration of people also allows the 
pooling of other resources such as wealth, raw materials, labour etc. which can be used to 
work towards the war effort.  This is especially important in the scaling of economies in 
fortified cities.  As Glaeser & Shapiro note:  
“If a city has a population of N, and if each person occupies a fixed area of space (denoted 
A), then the size of the wall needed to circle around city will equal 2 √πAN. The size of city 
walls scales with the square root of the city population, so that the length of wall that must be 
built per person declines sharply with the size of the city.” (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002 p209). 
 
Many of the principles and safety affects related to agglomeration are no longer relevant in 
contemporary cities (Little, 2004).  However, a number remain, for example it is easier to 
enforce no-fly zones over denser cites than it is decentralized areas and it is easier to 
establish perimeters and blockades on cities than rural areas or even suburban areas (Glaeser 
& Shapiro, 2002).  Density today still has useful defensive purposes and is a reality of the 
contemporary world.  The main issues with relation to terrorism today are the fact that 
technology has affected the scaled advantage of physical combat (Little, 2004).  Today, 
relatively few individuals can do a significant amount of harm to a much larger group 
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(Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002).  In the past a single soldier or warrior would do little more than 
get oneself killed when confronting a much larger group.  Today, the violent actions of the 
few have greatly affected the concept of scaled warfare.  The events of September 11, 2001, 
the Madrid Train bombing in 2004 or the London transportation network attacks in 2005 
demonstrate how relatively few people have been able to kill a large number of people and 
cause extreme economic and social damage providing some theorists with an argument 
against density and agglomeration. 
2.2 Terrorism and Urban Populations 
 
The purpose of the following section is to examine the effects of mass violence and terrorism 
on urban form.  Historical example are used to analyze how terrorism and mass violence 
have affected populations, changed the form of cities over time, and how it could change the 
nature of the structures within cities and how they interact with one another.  The issues of 
decentralization and agglomeration tendencies are woven into the discussion of urban form 
that follows.  Along with economic implications they form a key set of determinants 
influencing how urban form changes in the presence of real or perceived violence and 
terrorism.  The evidence and analysis below also highlights some of the responses to mass 
violence and terrorism in North American planning and how it has directly affected the urban 
form of contemporary cities.  Population is an important consideration in urban form because 
it can drive how cities plan and build.  Urban growth in many areas of the world is being 
managed by increasing densities and building up rather than out.  With stagnant or falling 
populations this is not necessarily a concern.  Permanent populations of residents can 
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determine how a city grows and where it grows.  This is an integral part of the form of cities.  
Additionally if fear and death are causing a city’s population to fall effects on form and 
development can follow. 
Permanent populations unlike transient populations such as tourists tend to be much more 
resilient in resisting terrorism and acts of violence (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002).  Although 
little information is available research by Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002 have demonstrated this 
to be true in several areas of the world.  Historical examples from WWII demonstrate that 
cities can be very resilient as was the case in London when despite mass destruction and 
death the population of the city only fell by approximately 10% (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002).   
2.3 Cities as Targets 
 
The agglomeration of people in cites has the potential to make them targets for violence.  
Larger cities create more attractive targets as urban density means that there are more people 
to steal from or kill in a smaller area (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002).  This relationship between 
violence and urban density demonstrates how in the past raiders, marauders, war and 
pillaging affected urban form and how today terrorism is affecting urban form.  As was 
previously discussed the agglomeration of people in cites made individuals safer.  They were 
able to erect walls and defensive fortifications and change the scale effect of war in their 
favour.  What historical examples provide for contemporary security planners are examples 
of sustained urban conflict over a long period of time.  This is especially important when we 
consider the role that population numbers play in the influencing of urban form.  Large, 
dense populations have a direct impact on the form of cities and how cities are planned.  
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Dense cities lend themselves to having tall buildings, subway systems and other planned 
infrastructure to support the population.     
The city of Rome provides an excellent example of how violence directly impacts urban 
form.  After numerous sacking at the hands of Visigoth leader Alaric I, the population of 
Rome dropped from over 1 million in the year 210 to approximately 35 000 at the beginning 
of the middle ages.  Consistent attacks and looting meant that living in the hinterland around 
Rome was safer than the city itself due to the constant threats and economic disparity created 
by the sacking (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; Tellier, 2009). History provides many more 
examples of how violence on a consistent bases effects the population and therefore the 
urban form of a city. The 17
th
 century depopulation of German cities such as Marburg which 
was occupied eleven times from 1620 to 1650 during the Thirty Years War provides an 
excellent example (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; Wedgwood, 1961). 
2.4 Destruction of infrastructure and transportation 
Historically, transportation proved to be a dangerous endeavor; if the creation of city walls 
made the them safer, then the traveling between cities was inherently dangerous (Glaeser and 
Shapiro, 2002).  Historical examples provide evidence of how often transportation 
infrastructure has been attacked in the past. However the effects of this destruction on the 
urban form of cities of the past cannot be translated to today.  For example during Lawrence 
of Arabia’s war with the Ottoman Empire he destroyed a great deal of rail infrastructure, 
Terrorists in New York used airplanes to destroy the world trade center, in Spain trains have 
been bombed, in London suicide bombers attacked the subway and the bus network killing 
many people.  These acts of destruction and violence demonstrate the strategic importance of 
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infrastructure in cities and how they are often targeted.  What is demonstrated by these 
examples is the vulnerability to transportation networks and how often they are targeted.  
Urban planning has a role to play in the mitigation of causalities due to attacks on urban 
transportation infrastructure.  The aim of security planning is firstly to save lives and 
secondly to preserve capital as Rossi-Hansberg (2004) states, identifying that the economic 
impact of terrorism due to the destruction of capital investment is a serious planning concern.  
What is most important in the contemporary context with respect to transportation is the cost 
associated with transportation infrastructure.  As Rossi-Hansberg 2004 states:  
“The threat of future attacks leads to permanent changes in city structure since the potential 
of future physical capital destruction reduces the returns to capital investments in many 
locations within the city. Firms and residents will be willing to invest less in structures at 
those locations, which in turn changes their bid rents, and therefore the structure of the city” 
(Rossi-Hansberg 2004 p 904). 
 
Physical capital such as subways, trains (lines and stations), and roads are an extremely 
expensive and important part of urban form. Without them the city cannot develop in a dense 
and sustainable manner.  Thus their destruction brings about obvious changes to the form of 
cities.  The destruction of the underground path system in New York in 2001 demonstrates 
this well and has resulted in an increased cost of transportation in New York since (Glaeser 
and Shapiro, 2002).  If people cannot travel by subway because it has been destroyed and 
will take years to replace the need for parking may increase or the use of busses may become 
more usual.  These changes in transportation can directly affect how a city develops.   
2.5 Defensive Dispersal – Sprawl as a Strategy 
The post WWII era brought with it many social, economic and urban changes.  The death and 
destruction of war was fresh in the mind of people and their reactions to the world around 
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them reflected the collective mood which existed at the time in North America.  The events 
of the war also had a profound impact on the way in which planners viewed their cities.  The 
bombing of cities such as Dresden and Tokyo as well as the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki demonstrated the destructive power which existed in the world.  Reacting to 
this many planners began advocating for a policy of ‘defensive dispersal’ in order to mitigate 
the effects of explosive threats to cities (Rhodes, 1986).  The movement was largely 
developed in the United States shortly after the dropping of the atomic bombs in Japan.  
Realizing the devastation which could be caused in single explosion planners opted to react 
against this and develop a strategy to decrease the likelihood of an attack and dampen the 
effects of an attack should it occur.  The movement was led largely by veteran planner 
Tracey B. Augur from the United States (Rhodes, 1986)
1
. 
With a great amount of post war development taking place Augur argued that a “dispersed 
pattern of small efficient cities [that are] much more attuned to the needs of modern living, 
modern commerce and modern industry” should be developed in place of adding to the dense 
cities which he argued would make them “more inviting targets” (Scott, 1969; Dunley, 
2002).  The rationale behind this thinking was that if cities were dispersed properly the use of 
a nuclear weapon would not completely shut down a city.  With the proper dispersal of 
industry and population no single attack would be able to halt production in a given area 
making it less likely to be targeted in addition to being significantly more resilient.  Augur 
                                                   
Augur had the unique position of not only being a planner following WWII but had worked on the secret 
project “Atomic City” as a planning consultant in the development of Oak Ridge.  The Project was aimed at 
developing  manufacturing facilities for the production of nuclear arms (Rhodes, 1986).  Combining his 
employment with the issues of the day and the personally haunting images of the bombing of European and 
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was concerned not only with the agglomeration of people but also of industry as 
manufacturing had been a significant target during the WWII era seeing as it was the means 
of support for the war effort and an integral part of the military industrial complex in the 
United States.  Augur’s new urban form would see the construction of satellite towns with 
specific parameters for construction similar to Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City concept.   
Other planners of the day such as Detroit Planner Donald Monson would build on this 
principle arguing that the creation of satellite towns was not enough and that the center of 
cities needed to be broken up in order to create a safer environment (Dudley, 2002).  The 
plans of Augur and Monson also called for the mass use of expressways to link the satellite 
towns.  They also argued that the expressway projects would increase the rate of slum 
clearance and that  
“Once the construction of satellites was well under way, and freeways driven through the 
metropolitan areas, work could then commence on widening the right-of-ways of these 
expressways and relocating former residents. The long-term view was to convert the central 
mass to a ‘number of more or less self-contained communities with populations of 50,000 to 
100,000 each, separated one from another by broad belts of open space” (Dunley, 2002 p 
53). 
 
These plans coupled with the fact that slum clearance was becoming very popular across the 
United States and with new technologies which allowed decentralization such as telephones 
and radio the ideas proposed by the two were seen as not only safer forms of development 
and living but also more desirable (Dudley, 2002).  The excerpt from Monson’s work with 
his economist wife Astrid Monson demonstrates the prevailing thought of the day and the 
general view toward decentralization; 
                                                                                                                                                             
British cities, Augur encouraged his colleges to consider decentralization as a strategy for urban defense 
(Scott, 1969).   
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the present fearful . . . threat hanging over the great city [will] have been turned into so 
great a blessing that men, looking backward in an age in which atomic power shall have 
been fully harnessed to peaceful ends, will say that the greatest benefit which flowed from the 
explosion at Los Alamos [sic] was the enforced rebuilding of our urban centers. (Monson, D 
& Monson, A 1951 p 111). 
 
With prevailing thoughts such as these amongst high ranking planners coupled with the 
Defense Department (now Department of Defense, DOD) plans for increased highway 
creation as a defense tool, cities had the necessary conditions to create sprawling suburbs 
highly dependent on the automobile.  In fact, the Defense Department was instrumental in the 
creation of many highway routes which were built as defense infrastructure, “While the 
majority of the intercity routes (totaling 37,700 miles) had been tentatively mapped out in 
1944 (St.Clair 1986 p 156), the Defense Department had been consulted regarding the 
remaining 2,300 miles, which were planned as circumferential routes so that (bombed) urban 
centers could be bypassed” (Dunley 2001p 60).  This was a largely American phenomena 
and cannot be considered the singular reason for the creation of sprawling suburbs, however 
the availably of transportation routes created by it would certainly influence mobility and 
people’s ability to live further from employment centers.  
The decentralization of urban centers in the United States demonstrates how perceived 
threats of violence can affect city form.  The development of the atomic bomb as well as the 
experiences of WWII provide excellent examples of planning changes which can come about 
following acts of violence and destruction.   
The examples above provide historical precedents for the depopulation of cities due to 
violence and the changing of urban form due to realized and perceived threats of terrorism or 
violence in cities.   
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2.6 Perceived and Realized Terrorist Threats 
The perceived threat of terrorism is one of the most costly affects of the aftermath of an 
attack.  While the initial attack may destroy a large amount of capital in a city the fallout 
from such an event can be even greater in that it deters the creation of new capital in the area 
out of fear of future attack.  Additionally, as Rossi-Hansberg (2004) states the effects of 
realized attack can have more far reaching implications for urban business and the generation 
of funds by reducing agglomeration tendencies in firms and reducing population as well as 
creating significant transaction costs.  He argues that capital destruction creates considerable 
costs and distorts agglomeration tendencies and forces.  The time and effort taken to rebuild 
infrastructure will therefore be more costly than the real cost of replacement as 
agglomeration will fade, population growth will slow or fall and a generally lower return on 
capital will result. (Rossi-Hansberg, 2004). 
This is best seen in the case of New York City where the destruction of the World Trade 
Center as well as other structures has created a significantly different urban form in the local 
area.  The reduction of almost 13 million square feet of class A office space in Manhattan has 
created a significant shift in the office structure of the city.  The Costar real-estate group 
citing the findings of Julien J. Studley Inc found that: 
“The majority of large displaced tenants signed leases in locations outside of Downtown 
Manhattan. For transactions larger than 50,000 square feet, 65% signed in Midtown, 17% in 
New Jersey, 5% in Westchester County, NY, and Connecticut and 9% in Brooklyn and 
Queens in New York” (Heschmeye, 2001 p 221).   
 
This mass exodus from Manhattan represents the profound effects which even a single 
terrorist attack can have on the urban from of the area.  In fact a vacancy rate increase from 
10.4% to 12.9%, an increase of 24% was reported in downtown New York from the period of 
 
  18 
September 2001 to September 2002 (Eisinger, 2004). What is also important to consider in 
situations such as this is the larger affect which decentralizations has on the supporting and 
spin-off businesses in the area.  Agglomeration tends to create spillover and spinoff in similar 
and supporting sectors.  As noted by Koo 2005; 
“Studies have emphasized reduced transaction costs, knowledge spillovers, diverse 
intermediate goods suppliers, and deep labor pools as possible drivers of firm 
agglomeration. Among these candidates, knowledge spillovers lie at the heart of discussions 
in the literature. If knowledge spillovers are so important, it follows that firms tend to locate 
in proximity to capitalize on the knowledge stock in neighboring firms. There- fore, 
agglomeration and spillovers reinforce each other” (Koo, 2005 p 35). 
 
Without this reinforcement and the decentralization of business it is therefore possible to 
surmise that the displacement of industries due to terrorism are at a disadvantage compared 
to those which are centralized and have access to the tacit knowledge of one another.  
Additionally the supporting industry of service providers such as food services, office supply 
retailers, copy centers etc. all suffer at the hands of decentralization of business into other 
areas in and near New York.  Those firms whose business was predicated on geographic 
location near major firms severely suffered when the World Trade Center was destroyed and 
business moved elsewhere.  This also has a direct impact on the urban form of the local area.  
Not only have structures themselves been destroyed but the business culture which drives 
investment and ultimately affects urban form in the area has also been affected.  Without the 
staple of the World Trade Center which was heavily subsidized by the government and 
Nelson Rockefeller downtown New York may fall into a state of significant decline, 
especially considering the dominance of Mid Town Manhattan which has three times as 
many employees as does Downtown (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002).  With lower levels of 
employment in downtown especially following the exodus of agglomerated firms and the 
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destruction of local structures there comes a fear that reinvestment will not follow due to lack 
of demand for office space in the area, and the availability of space elsewhere including Mid 
Town, New Jersey and possibly in the five boroughs.  Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002 state this well 
in the analysis of the condition of Downtown New York and the long-term impact of the 
destruction of buildings due to terrorism.   
“The long-term impact of the destruction of buildings depends critically on whether the 
demand for physical space in the area is such that the buildings will be rebuilt. In an area 
where demand is great enough to pay for the costs of new construction, the physical 
destruction will not matter. However, in other cases, when the demand is low, the destruction 
of physical infrastructure may matter a great deal. In some cases, agglomeration economies 
may mean that demand for the space was high before the bombing but low afterward. If the 
price of space after the destruction is not high enough to cover the costs of new construction, 
then the direct impact of bombing will be permanent” (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002 p 213). 
 
The destruction witnessed in New York demonstrates the changing nature of war and 
terrorism and how relatively few people can cause extreme hardship for an entire city due to 
advances in technology.  This is a far cry from a single marauder attacking a walled city of 
the past where it was more likely that one would only get themselves killed in an act of 
violence against a city.  The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrate the inherent 
vulnerability of cities to attack and the fact that agglomeration people and business makes 
cities more likely targets for terrorism than other forms of development especially rural or 
hinterland development.  While there are certainly instances of attacks on other targets such 
as the Pentagon also on September 11, 2001 and various embassies and the Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City in 1995, even these structures have a common themes of agglomeration 
associated with them.  They centralize power, resources, personnel and knowledge in a single 
area and make themselves targets for terrorists.  Additionally, they have symbolic power as 
they are intuitions of government and power which when destroyed create a significant and 
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powerful symbol around the world.  Despite the effects of terrorism on urban form and the 
function of cities there is encouraging evidence that terrorism is not necessarily a stronger 
decentralizing force than urbanity is a centralizing force.   
The case presented by Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002 comparing the population of Jerusalem and 
Tel Aviv demonstrates this well.  Despite the increased rate of terrorism in Jerusalem 
compared to Tel Aviv the population of Jerusalem has climbed more rapidly than that of Tel 
Aviv.  The authors state that “It would seem that Jerusalem’s advantages—physical beauty, a 
strong tourist economy, and historical significance—outweigh the relative dangers of 
terrorism in that city” (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002 p 218).  
The effect of mass violence and terrorism in urban areas is complex.  Different instances 
around the world have produced different effects.  Some cities have grown and continue to 
do so in the presence of both real and perceived violence, while others decline and have their 
agglomerated firms disperse.  With reference to the Canadian landscape, it is difficult to 
determine what the effects of a major terrorist attack in a city such as Toronto would 
produce.  The negative effects suffered in New York are in part due to the heavy 
subsidization of the World Trade center and the loss of business in Downtown New York.  
Toronto has fewer business districts than does New York and would likely see the destroyed 
structures rebuilt at a faster rate than in New York.  However there is no certainty 
considering much depends on the economic and political climate of the time.   
Despite the uncertainty created by terrorism history and research have made some aspects 
very clear; cities are likely targets for terrorist attacks, agglomeration of businesses, people 
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and government intuitions makes them attractive targets and the destruction of structures and 
the threat of violence whether it be real or perceived greatly affects urban from in cities. 
2.7 The Issue of Decentralization  
Canadian planning policy has made strong movements in favor of a more centralized urban 
form.  One characterized by having people live close to where they work, inhabit high 
density structures and neighborhoods and agglomerating commercial, residential and 
industrial activities in close proximity to one another and often next to or on top of one 
another.  The city of Toronto which is home to 2.84 million people in the city proper and 5.5 
million in the metro area is Canada’s largest urban center and main economic engine.  Plans 
by the City of Toronto strongly advocate for a more centralized city not only from an 
economic and logistical point of view but there is a general belief that this form of more 
dense urban living is more desirable.   
“The same characteristics and qualities that make these cities great places to visit also make 
them great places to live.  What do these places share in common?  All are very urban, high 
density, mixed use, mixed income, transited and pedestrian oriented vibrant places” (City of 
Toronto Official Plan, p 158 s 3-1). 
 
Additionally, higher level provincial policy is demanding that cities become more compact 
and the former urban pattern of decentralized development be done away with in favor of a 
more centralized urban form as the excerpt from the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe describes; 
“increasing intensification of the existing built-up area, with a focus on urban growth 
centres, intensification corridors, major transit station areas, brownfield sites and greyfields. 
Concentrating new development in these areas also provides a focus for transit and 
infrastructure investments to support future growth… By the year 2015 and for each year 
thereafter, a minimum of 40 per cent of all residential development occurring annually 
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within each upper- and single-tier municipality will be within the built-up area” (Ontario 
Ministry of Infrastructure, 2006 p 10).  
 
These policies follow a plethora of planning theory and research which advocates for the 
centralization of cities in the contemporary era.  The idea of smart growth which advocates 
denser more manageable and prosperous cities with efficient delivery of services and 
agglomeration of business and people has a strong presence in academic literature and 
planning practice (Myers, 1999; Fader 1999; Danielsen, Lang & Fulton, 1999, Fox, 2009).  
While many scholars and planning officials have adopted this as conventional wisdom there 
are others who advocate for the decentralization of cities. Those who support the continued 
decentralization of cities do so for a variety of reasons such as social reform, economics and, 
in the scope of this research, for the safety of city dwellers.  In the decade following 
September 11, 2001 many experts in the security field have advocated for a less dense urban 
form in order to minimize potential losses and deter terrorism (Briffault, 2001). 
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Chapter 3: Recent Security Planning Trends and Developments  
In the post WWII years some municipalities and planners have taken it upon themselves to 
develop security plans that are tailored to their specific needs. (Dudley, 2002)  Similar to the 
criteria of official plans and sometimes incorporated in them; these security plans are aimed 
at creating safer urban environments.  In fact it is a legal requirement of major cities to have 
a plan in place which deals with the complex issue of security planning as outlined clearly in 
a staff report on security planning prepared by the City of Toronto in 2008.  It states;  
“Senior management are legally responsible to ensure employees, patrons, and assets are 
appropriately protected and to ensure security programs are in place that deter, detect, and 
respond” (Nichol, 2009 p 4).  
 
This mandate is largely based on Bill c-45, created by the federal government in 2004 to 
address security, criminal and occupational health and safety issues.  The main provisions of 
the bill as outlined in section 217.1 of the Criminal Code state that it: 
“Created rules for establishing criminal liability to organizations for the acts of their 
representatives.  
Establishes a legal duty for all persons "directing the work of others" to take reasonable steps 
to ensure the safety of workers and the public.  
Sets out the factors that courts must consider when sentencing an organization.  
Provides optional conditions of probation that a court may impose on an organization.” 
(Canadian Center for Occupational Health and Safety, 2010) 
Past security plans in North America have focused largely on creating patrols and assessing 
building security (Nichol, 2009).  Corporate security remains the main interest of most 
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municipalities with regard to security with some emphasis on safe city doctrine.  Current 
security planning has a much larger focus with  many more issues under its umbrella 
including: anti-terrorism, emergency planning, domestic violence, crime prevention and 
many other matters, which may occur locally and fall under the sphere of security planning 
(Nichol, 2009).  In the case of the Toronto, the city has taken it upon itself to develop an 
action plan in order to mitigate the effects of terrorism and other security issues.  Toronto 
reflects the general trend being adopted by large municipalities which are developing their 
own security plans on a variety of bases and are makings significant contribution to the 
literature surrounding security and anti-terrorism planning.  The 2006 World Urban Form 
provides an excellent example where security concerns were addressed and made center 
stage in the working document for the event.  Most importantly the policies and practices 
being developed in municipalities around the country are putting into practice many of the 
theoretical and technological developments which the academic world has created.  
Advances in Geographic Information Science for example have made their way into the 
framework of security planning and the development of anti-terrorism strategies for urban 
areas (VanHor & Mosurinjohn, 2010).  What the Toronto staff report on a city wide security 
plan has accomplished is the identification of benefits associated with having security plans 
in place to deal with the many issues which may arise.  However, many of the steps taken by 
the municipality fail to take into consideration higher level security concerns such as 
terrorism.   
One of the most important products of reports such as the Toronto Staff report is the publicity 
which security and anti-terrorism planning receives.  While relatively minor in the overall 
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contribution of knowledge to the field, the identification of a gap in understanding on the part 
of municipalities and the increased conversation about the topic brings with it a potentially 
great influence.  This is especially true in Canada’s largest cities, which are the most likely 
targets of terrorist activity and have the highest potential for disaster (Coaffee et al 2009).   
3.1 The Role of Regionalism 
Reports such as those mentioned above demonstrate that the issues are being looked at in a 
local municipal context.  However, most cities do not have the resources or necessity to 
develop their own city-wide security plans and some areas are turning to a regional approach 
in order to overcome these challenges.  Unfortunately, the case has been that regional level 
security plans are generally developed following a major disaster (Caruson & MacManus, 
2007).  The case of Hurricane Katrina in Florida provides an excellent example of this and 
demonstrates how regional organization and preparedness can be used in the place of 
municipal security plans.  Though a natural disaster, Hurricane Katrina provides a recent 
example of how wider scale cooperation can be used to better prepare cities for disaster and 
how the pooling of resources create safer environments.  Regionalism’s appeal as a method 
for enhancing intergovernmental cooperation has only grown in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina (Caruson & MacManus, 2007; Comfort, 2002).  However as is often the case 
progress is made in the face of tragedy.  Similarly Florida as a state has moved toward using 
regionalism to respond to the ever present threat of natural disaster there.  Florida which in 
the wake of an immense disaster made progress toward meaningful cooperation between 
different levels of government and created security plans to mitigate the effects of disaster, 
Canadian policy has not.  What is strongly demonstrated by Caruson and MacManus (2007) 
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is the policy shift which is taking place across North America in order to create a safer 
environment.  In the case of Canada, many cities are focusing on the creation of municipal 
plans as mandated by law and encouraged by the economic and social benefits which can 
come with it.  However, Canadian public planning literature is demonstrating the vertical 
disintegration which exists within it.  
However, academics and some governments are stressing the importance of regionalism as a 
way to mitigate attacks and preserve life across many cities.  As mentioned, most cities will 
not be able to fend for themselves in the event of a large scale terrorist attack or natural 
disaster as admitted by some in the 2008 Emergency Preparedness Report created by the 
Federal Government of Canada.  Bing able to call on the resources of nearby cities and 
concentrate personnel and equipment is a critical requirement of managing a natural or 
human made disaster.  While cooperation between cities does exist the logistical issues which 
a lack of equipment and training has caused has been identified as a serious concern for 
municipality’s ability to respond to a terrorist attack, prepare of a terrorist attack or generally 
respond emergency situations as they arise (EPC, 2008). 
One of the recent influential policy initiatives in security planning is the idea of regionalism 
and having plans and strategies in place for a variety of events.  A large focus of this is the 
logistical network which needs to be developed to ensure that within a region, experts, 
equipment and personnel are available at a moment’s notice and have been trained to respond 
to the disaster scenario which has been presented to them.  This concept of regionalism 
builds on the simple idea that we are stronger together than standing alone.  It is also in line 
with the idea that safety and security are not only the responsibility of high ranking officials, 
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police or the military.  This thinking may also have to do with the fact that more civilian 
targets are being attacked in urban areas.  In recent years many Canadian regions, as part of 
their emergency preparedness plans have coordinated services between cities in order to 
respond to the possibility of larger occurrences.  Regionalism is allowing resources to be 
pooled in order to prevent local emergency services from being overwhelmed in the event of 
a disaster.     
3.2 Creation and Adoption of Security Plans 
In the past decade many of Canada’s largest cities have moved toward the creation of city-
wide security policies but have not gone so far as to draft any plans and bring them into law.  
Policies have been worked into the larger framework of official plans however security 
master plans remain rare and underdeveloped.  The City of Hamilton provides an example of 
this, when in February 2006 a submission was made to council suggesting the creation of a 
city-wide security plan.  Since that event no plan has been made public demonstrating the 
lack of will, funding or bureaucratic issues have waylaid the plan.  The literature analysis of 
Canadian cities has demonstrated that while security concerns do arise in many places, and 
that some minor security issues are worked into master plans, there is little emphasis on the 
creation of an independent security master plan in most cities.  Where security planning has 
arisen as an issue of concern it has been demonstrated that terrorism and anti-terrorism 
strategies are not at the forefront of thought.  Security, at the municipal and regional level in 
Canada is largely concerned with issues of public safety as they relate to conventional crime, 
property damage in the form of vandalism and similar issues (Nichol 2009).  The issue of 
terrorism is either avoided or overlooked as regional and municipal governments focus on 
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matters which they have experienced.  The City of Hamilton demonstrates this trend in their 
own policy which states: 
“The City of Hamilton is committed to providing a safe and secure environment in its 
facilities for employees, visitors and users of its facilities. Protection of assets from theft and 
unlawful activities or destruction is a major continuing objective. The City will make every 
effort to enhance security in its facilities by providing state of the art technology and access 
control, surveillance, and physical security”(D’Angelo, 2006 p 1). 
 
What is also demonstrated in the language used by the City of Hamilton is the emphasis on 
making publically owned property safer and enhancing security at its own facilities.  This is 
not an uncommon trend in publically available security planning literature.   Much of the 
focus is devoted to areas or structures which are directly owned by the municipality and 
therefore where liability also lies.   However what is often missing in the publically available 
security planning literature produced by governments are plans by to make cities as a whole 
safer by means of physical security improvements, policy changes or the use of security 
personnel or police.  Without these thoughts or plans in place there is little chance that city 
wide security plans will come into existence let alone a highly connected regional network.  
It must be noted however that this review of literature has examined publically available 
security plans.  There is a real possibility that security plans, especially in areas such as 
Ottawa and Toronto, exist but are not made public for a variety of reasons.  What is common 
in Canada however is the lack of strong security mandates being placed on municipalities or 
Canada’s provinces or being developed by them independently. There is little emphasis 
placed on preventing terrorism at a local or regional level using urban planning tools and 
techniques. 
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3.3 Academic Literature: Resilience, Infrastructure and Aesthetics  
The state of understanding and literature that exists in the academic world is far more 
advanced, involved and specialized than the practice of security planning at municipal and 
regional levels, and what is often used at higher levels of aggregation such as a by federal 
agencies and national police forces.  What academic literature has identified as a policy 
problem, which is preventing governments from being properly prepared for major disaster, 
is the lack of intergovernmental cooperation for dealing with terrorism or other large scale 
emergency situations.  Internal cooperation at the closest-to-the-ground level is fractures as 
demonstrated by Canada’s largest municipality.  A 2009 internal staff report demonstrates 
this well, stating;  
“In the case of Agencies, Boards, and Commissions (ABCs), there are ABCs  
without any dedicated security management and a few with dedicated security management 
including Exhibition Place, the Toronto Parking Authority, the Toronto Transit Commission, 
and the Toronto Zoo. These ABC’s have dedicated security management and programs 
because of unique operational, physical, and legislative security requirements, as well as, for 
the most part very defined property limits. There exists little coordinated security between 
ABC’s and between ABC’s and Corporate Security” (City of Toronto 2009, City Wide 
security Plan Staff Report p 4). 
 
  Academic literature is also demonstrating that municipalities are not prepared to handle the 
effects of terrorism on their own (Comfort, 2002).  Academics are stressing the importance of 
regionalism in the face of disaster and anti-terrorism planning.  Shifting policy toward a more 
vertically and horizontally integrated system of anti-terrorism and disaster management is 
one of the trends in management which has appeared in the past decade.  Some areas of 
North America are embracing this new principle however most have not reached this step.   
In order to operationalize many of the proposed policy changes, research in the academic 
field has focused largely on the concepts of resilience, and physical infrastructure.  The two 
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concepts which are explored in my own research are two fundamental concepts of anti-
terrorism planning and have been at the forefront of anti-terrorism planning in the past 
decade.  Resilience is a measure of how well a system can bounce back from an attack and 
regenerate in order to be prepared for more of the same as well as how quickly it can return 
to normality (Campanella, 2006).  Physical infrastructure with respect to security planning 
refers to capital projects aimed at preventing or dampening the effects of terrorist attacks.  
Both of these concepts are well researched and have made great progress in the past decade.  
The incorporation of various technologies such as 3D modeling, geographic information 
science and systems as well as materials science has led to the development of new and less 
intrusive ways of dealing with terrorism while maintaining an atmosphere in cities which 
feels safe without adding the feeling of impending doom (Coaffee & O’Hare, 2008).   
The preservation of aesthetics and accessibility in cities has also been a forefront issue in 
recent security planning.  The idea that cities belong to the people who inhabit them and visit 
and are not to be secured as military instillations is a common theme which is running 
through much of the academic literature as of late.  These ideas are reinforced by the notion 
that creating a sense of fear and limiting the use of our cities because of the perceived threat 
of terrorism is not conducive to the mental health of people nor is it conducive to good 
business (Coaffee & O’Hare, 2008).  Both of these issues have been brought to the forefront 
of security planning, as planners must now seek a way to ensure constant security without 
constant interference.  The drive to preserve aesthetics in the face of terrorism is in itself 
important but has also made important contributions to the advancement of physical 
infrastructure, which aims to mitigate and prevent terrorist attacks.  These advancements in 
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thinking and science have led to the current state of security planning.  While these recent 
developments have had great influence on security planning the roots of the practice In 
Canada are largely influenced by British experiences dealing with the Irish Republican Army 
(Coaffee, 2004).  When dealing with these issues British security planners opted to erect 
rings of steel and concrete to prevent attacks by IRA members (Coaffee, 2004).  In doing so 
the British planners created a system in which London was nearly closed off to citizens, who 
were forced through many security barriers.  Witnessing the results of IRA attacks in London 
and the detrimental effects which these security measures had on the social, economic and 
aesthetics properties in the city of London as well as others in Britain where terrorism was an 
issue and forced security planners to reconsider their methods. 
3.4 Physical and Social Geography of Terrorism  
Traditional security planning focused largely on utilitarian security infrastructure and 
surveillance on areas that were seen as high risk targets (Coaffee et al 2009). Current 
practices have strayed away from this form of thinking, as the geography of terrorism has 
widened and there are more potential targets throughout urban areas which were traditionally 
not targeted (Coaffee et al 2009).  Apart from nontraditional targets, new thinking in security 
planning has also shifted the burden of public security to planning officials, citizens groups, 
and other public and private institutions (Coaffee et al 2009, Rose, 2000; Coaffee & O’Hare, 
2008).  While experts remain a strong and important force in security planning, the number 
of people working in the field has increased.  Academic attitudes and public policy relating to 
terrorism have also had identifiable geographic differences with respect to academic 
literature and the implementation of public policy.  British researchers as of late have focused 
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a great deal of attention on qualitative methods of inquiry, while American political scholars 
have focused largely on quantitative analysis (Coaffee et al 2009).  Changes in thinking with 
respect to the built form have also taken place and have been identified in academic 
literature.   
Environmental determinism has had a reassurance in security policy as architects, engineers, 
planners and the like seek to control the movements of people. In opposition to this some 
scholars argue that the geography of cities is changing creating ‘landscapes of terror’ 
(Coaffee et al 2009, Pawley, 1998; Coaffee, 2003; Weizman, 2007).  These types of 
landscapes have been accused of being both placeless in that they are inconspicuous and have 
no particular draw or iconic nature to them. The idea being that anonymous places are less 
likely to be targeted (Pawley, 1998).  On the other hand some critics have been vocal of the 
creation of architecture of fear which has been obviously reinforced in order to deter and 
mitigate acts of terrorism.  This has left some in the security planning community and in 
academia split on the issue.  However in the face of these concerns the ideas of aesthetics and 
creating safe and hidden anti-terrorism infrastructure has arisen.  This may be largely due to 
the changing environments which are being targeted by terrorists.  This has been especially 
true in the British experience when in 2007 two years following the London subway 
bombings, an attempt to bomb a popular nightclub was carried out (Coaffee et al 2009).  
Events such as this have spurred security planners and policy makers to reassess the 
geography of terrorism in light of the fact that people conducting their everyday business are 
now targets, especially in those places where population density is high and there is a great 
potential loss of life in the event of a terrorist attack.  Caoaffee (2009) states: 
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“A new front has therefore been opened in the global ‘War on Terror’ – the ‘home front’ – 
with a range of actors including the general public urged to help defend places from attack, 
or at least to take measures that will mitigate the effect of a successful strike” (p 247). 
 
The changes in the nature of terrorism have greatly influenced the practice of security 
planning and have created a new dynamic in the field where traditional experts are having 
their ideas and work criticized by and contributed to by various actors in the public and 
private realms.  This has perhaps been one of the most visible changes in security planning in 
the last decade.  As in all studies new ideas arise and new technology makes something 
possible and others obsolete.  However, the contributions of various actors in the urban realm 
have been one of the greatest changes in the war on terrorism.  Canada as well as many other 
countries is following a similar path.  Where in the past security was left to police, military 
and other federal security agencies it is now the prerogative of municipalities, regions and 
corporations.  Decisions by cities such as Hamilton, Mississauga, Toronto and others to 
create their own security master plans is in line with this new thinking that a wider audience 
must take responsibility for the security of the city and its population.  However the plans 
being proposed by these cities are in the preliminary stages and official security plans have 
yet to be published.  The case study of Washington D.C. in the following text demonstrates a 
complete and oppertionalized security plan.     
3.5 Emerging Targets and Tactics 
Unconventional tactics by terrorists and their use of advanced technology has also created a 
need for a greater emphasis to be place on a range of traditional and nontraditional targets 
including, soft targets which were traditionally not attacked in the past (Coaffee, 2009).  The 
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testimony of Brian Michael Jenkins before the Senate Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee on January 28, 2009 demonstrates this well: 
“Terrorists will continue to focus on soft targets that offer high body counts and that have 
iconic value. Nationally and internationally recognized venues that offer ease of access, 
certainty of tactical success, and the opportunity to kill in quantity will guide target selection. 
Public spaces are inherently difficult to protect. Major investments in target hardening make 
sense for government only when these provide a net security benefit, that is, when they do not 
merely displace the risk to another equally lucrative and accessible target” (Jenkins, 2009 p 
2). 
 
An excellent example of soft target attacks was witnessed in Mumbai in 2008 (Wade, 2009; 
Sengutpa, 2009)   This style of attack also demonstrated the use to wireless technology by 
terrorists and rare siege style tactics which were extremely successful at killing civilians and 
destroying infrastructure and businesses.  
With these new attacks being perpetrated against dense civilian targets, many security 
planners have adopted a new form of thinking and tactics that diminishes the emphasis on 
preventing attacks by seeking out perpetrators before an attack happens, although this does 
remain an important part of anti-terrorism and counter terrorism tactics.   This is especially 
true in North America where many plots have been foiled by various police services, an 
excellent example being the case of the “Toronto 18,” where a group of men plotted to 
destroy targets in Toronto in a similar style to the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York 
City (Teotonio, 2009). While public civilian areas have come to be popular targets in recent 
years, cities, especially those with large financial and public institutions in them have always 
been and remain targets (Webb & Cutter, 2010).  In fact New York City accounts for 19.9% 
of all terrorist related attacks in the United States before 2005, demonstrating that well 
known cities with many financial and government structures are targets of terrorist activity 
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(Webb & Cutter, 2010).  The targets of terrorism have not dissipated in recent years but 
expanded as the scope of possible targets increases with the widening moral latitude terrorists 
have (Coaffee, 2003).   It may be that Toronto falls into the same category as New York, 
seeing as it is similar in many ways.  Statistics such as this demonstrate that need for Anti-
terrorism planning considerations to occur in major cities seeing as metropolitan areas the 
most likely targets of terrorist attacks (Coaffee, 2003, Webb & Cutter, 2010).   
New emphasis is being placed on preparedness for a successful attack and predicting where 
and when an attack will occur rather than preventing it outright.  The notion of inevitability 
and being able to respond to a successful attack has become more important as the scope of 
morally acceptable targets of terrorists has widened in the face of religious extremism.  This 
makes all areas of cities potentially vulnerable and it is generally accepted that not all areas 
can be protected against attack, therefore the goal of response and minimizing the loss of life 
and damage must be focused on. 
The current state of security and anti-terrorism planning has been largely influenced by 
changes in the nature of terrorism.  The prominence of suicide bombings as a major tactic has 
also led to changes in the anti-terrorism tactics employed by security planners. In response to 
the new tactics and use of technology by terrorists, experts and academics are moving toward 
a system of national defense wherein a wider group of people is responsible for the 
protection of people and property.  Some North American cities have begun to draft their 
own security master plans; however, many of them do not have a strong focus on the risk 
posed by terrorists.  There has also been a movement toward regional organization of cities in 
light of the fact that no one city can stand alone against this threat and that response and 
 
  36 
mitigation measures will be more timely and effective if policy requires reorganization at this 
level in order to prepare for disaster scenarios Caruson & MacManus, 2007; Comfort, 2002).    
Finally the psychology and environmental determinism in security planning is being 
considered once again as some scholars and practitioners opt for fortress style urban spaces 
while others seek to create anonymous spaces which are less likely to be targeted while 
another group of new thinkers reinforce the ideas of aesthetics and creating hidden security 
infrastructure.  While the role of the security planner is widening and the number of players 
is increasing the goal of preserving life and property remains the same although some have 
adopted the attitude of inevitability of attack and seek to minimize the damage caused by a 
successful attack rather than prevent the occurrence of one.       
To combat many of these tactics and to create safer security environments security planners 
have adopted a variety of technical and social tools to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks.  
The following section describes common preventative measures the thinking behind them 
and how they are influencing the urban form cities.  This section will also demonstrate how 
planners can easily implement many of the technological and aesthetic tools in their own 
cities without the approval of higher levels of government while operating well within the 
described mandates.  It will also demonstrate how physical changes can change the urban 
form of cities and how by using innovative strategies planners are able to dampen the 
negative aesthetic impact of anti-terrorism infrastructure and retain the traditional atmosphere 
while proving a secure environment. 
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3.6 Aesthetics  
The notion of beautiful cities which inspire people and encourage them to walk the streets 
and attract visitors is one which is deeply valued. While the goal of many terrorists is to 
destroy these areas it is necessary that those whose job and duty it is to protect them do not 
inadvertently destroy their quality in the process of defending them. New technology is 
allowing defense planners to do away with the rings of steel once used to defend urban areas. 
New innovations such as hydraulic bollards, turn tables, tiger traps, road blockers, closed 
circuit television (CCTV) and changes in the design of and look of traditional walls fences, 
bollards and the like are allowing cities to be well defended without compromising the 
aesthetic qualities which exists in the area. These new innovations combined with proper 
placement and well thought out urban design allow cities to both function well and appear 
pleasing while protecting the people and the environment in which they live.  
Realizing the importance of these qualities the city of Washington D.C. decided that it 
required long-term anti-terror infrastructure which would not compromise the quality of life 
in the city, as a result they created the National Capitol Planning Commission (NCPC). The 
mandate of this commission was to ensure that Washington D.C. was protected from possible 
future attacks without eroding the sense of freedom and the beautiful landscapes which exist 
in the city. In order to accomplish this, a task which is still ongoing, it was decided that 
concrete walls, steel fences and Jersey barriers would be replaced by a variety of 
aesthetically appealing hardened infrastructure. Since “fortress architecture is elevated to 
represent a national discourse of war, fear and entrenchment” it is necessary to blend security 
measures into the urban environment to prevent this (Benton-short, 2007).  
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3.7 Accessibility  
Urban security should not impede people’s ability to travel in and between cities and should 
not place undue hardship on visitors and residents of cities. Many anti-terror infrastructure 
changes in the post September 11 world have focused on target hardening and making overt 
statements of strength and protection (Coaffee, 2004). While it is necessary to sometimes 
display defensive prowess and create a general feeling of toughness in cities this cannot come 
at the expense of accessibility. Washington D.C., which is one of the world’s most iconic 
centers of freedom has seen its main avenues and streets turned into checkpoints emblematic 
of old Berlin. Traffic in many areas is halted during peak hours or during special events as 
main throughways such as Pennsylvania avenue have been shut down out of fear of a another 
attack on a high profile target. Queues have been erected in some areas causing pedestrian 
delays. Not only do these impediments to vehicular and pedestrian traffic interfere with the 
daily lives of residents they also have adverse economic effects.  
Contemporary urban defense design calls for infrastructure which does not impede traffic 
flows but rather, directs it better. It must also ensure that people with disabilities are not 
marginalized in the name of national security. New forms of urban security may rely on the 
tracking of individuals and detections of dangerous material rather than physical barriers. 
While there is a growing trend toward digital surveillance walls, bollards and barriers which 
are among the most fundamental security devices are irreplaceable and as such must be 
designed and implemented in ways which do not decrease people’s ability to move with ease 
in their environment.  
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3.8 Community context  
Unlike defensive strategies of the past, contemporary defense calls for citizens to live in a 
secure environment for the rest of their lives. Past anti-terror measures focused largely on the 
principles of fortress architecture and defensible place, to protect localized areas. Ireland in 
the 1970’s and Las Angeles provide us with examples of these experiments in national 
security (Coaffee 2004). Current wars are not fought and won in clear terms as such; 
contemporary defenses will be long lasting and ever-present. It is important for designers to 
design with the community in mind as mentioned above. As Brown stated in his New York 
Times article: “Barricades and bollards have become the newest accessory on this country’s 
psychic frontier … you might call it the architecture of paranoia. They call it defensible 
space” (Brown 1995). Terrorists have accomplished their goal if we destroy the sanctity and 
meaning of our monuments with architecture and measures of fear. While “the car bomb may 
become the ultimate weapon of crime and terror” in today’s urban battlefields, “Security 
solutions need to be very carefully planned to maintain the public amenities and aesthetic 
qualities in neighborhoods in which residents and visitors feel welcomed, comfortable, and 
safe” (Davis 1992 p 12, FEMA 426, 2003). It may be that freedom comes with a measure of 
acceptable risk, a measure which is yet to be determined, however it is not possible to have a 
city which functions well when its residents live in constant fear and inconvenience (Molotch 
and McClain, 2003). 
3.9 Site Specific Security Design 
The following section outlines some site specific anti-terrorism and traffic control measures 
which are being utilized thought North American.  An analysis of defensive tactics and site 
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analysis as outlined in the FEMA Risk Management Series is explained and developed 
below.  These tactics and analysis tools can help planners develop policy and site specific 
security requirements. 
The three layers of defense  
The three layers of defense system is a traditional, spatial way of examining and engineering 
both the built and natural environment around an asset. In involves analysis of the 
community surrounding an asset in the first layer; the area between perimeter defenses and 
an asset in the second layer and the asset itself in the third layer. This method examines the 
features of all of these areas and evaluates them from a spherical standpoint. Meaning that, 
security analysis of the sky, ground level and underground level are all covered and  
 
evaluated.  
Figure 1:  The three layers of defense provide a foundational structure for built form changes aimed at 
preventing and mitigating terrorist attacks.  
Source: FEMA 430 
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3.9.1 The first layer of defense  
The first layer of defense, also known as the outer layer or surrounding community is the first 
front in preventing a terrorist from detonating a devise at an interior target location. Careful 
analysis of the exterior community is essential in developing a sound an effective plan to 
protect interior assets against attack. Considerations such as viewpoints, local hazardous 
chemical sites, underground tunnels, sewer systems and more must be considered in order to 
effectively plan for the subsequent layers of defense which follow the first outer layer 
(FEMA 430, 2007). Understanding the first layer of defense requires an in depth knowledge 
of the types of activities and structures which exist in the third layer. By identifying what is 
common and what belongs it is easier to identify threats which do not belong. This can 
involve knowledge of transportation routes or the shipping and receiving habits of a local 
chemical company. Knowledge of the area surrounding an asset is essential in defending the 
asset. The fist layer of defense while defined by a geographic area exists largely in the minds 
of people especially those involved in the protection of an asset (Hopper & Droge 2005). 
Analysis of this layer allows for early detection of a threat and interception before it can 
reach an asset.  
3.9.2 The Second Layer of Defense  
The second layer of defense: “The primary strategy in planning the second layer of defense is 
to keep terrorists away from inhabited buildings” (FEMA 430, 2007 p 95 s 3-5).  
The goal of the second layer of defense is to prevent terrorists from gaining access to interior 
areas where their devices will yield the greatest amount of damage (FEMA 430, 2007). This 
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is done by creating both active and passive layers of defense.. Second layer defense systems 
which include fences, walls and other general perimeter defenses combine to create the line 
of demarcation. Perimeter defenses are especially important in dampening blast damage from 
a hand delivered or vehicle delivered device (FEMA 426, 2003). These barriers create the 
point of critical detonation which refers to the closest point of detonation assuming all 
security measures which are in place have not been comprised or breached. The distance 
between perimeter defenses and the target is known as the standoff distance (FEMA 426, 
2003). 
 
Figure 2: standoff distance can greatly dampen the effects of explosives in structures and 
people.  Maximizing standoff distance is however not always possible especially in dense urban 
areas or historical areas.  
Source: FEMA 430 
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Through the strengthening of the second layer of defense planners aim to increase standoff 
distance and create an environment in which an attacker would be detected. By increasing the 
distance between the blast and the target, designers expect that the force which does reach the 
building is insufficient to cause any damage to the structure, windows or people inside. 
While this tactic is seemingly simple in theory the practice of increasing standoff distance 
and erecting physical barriers which prevent people or vehicles from delivering explosives 
and which do not prevent honest, law-abiding citizens from enjoying and interacting with 
their environment is difficult. Secondly by creating a larger distance from perimeter defenses 
to an asset planners aim to detect a threat as it traverses that distance. Since it simply takes a 
longer time to cover a larger distance it is more likely that a threat headed toward an asset 
would be detected. Large standoff areas also give more time for security personnel to 
intervene creating a safer environment. Providing a larger distance between a target and its 
perimeter defenses also givers defense engineers and planners valuable space to perform 
target hardening improvements (FEMA 430, 2007). This is an especially important factor 
when considering the vulnerability of assets outside the city which service it such as water 
treatment facilities, dams and power plants. These installations are often situated on large 
plots of land with few or no surrounding buildings. As such the standoff distance between the 
outer perimeter and asset should be utilized to its fullest potential. This can involve 
surveillance systems, earthworks, motion detectors and where demanded lethal measures 
such as landmines. Planners must not overlook the 360 degrees of air space and underground 
space which exist in built communities (FEMA 430, 2007). While attacks from these angles 
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are unlikely especially in large urban centers they are not unprecedented. September 11, 2001 
provides the perfect example. Despite security measures taken at ground level the attack 
which brought down the World Trade Center came from the air. Many large structures may 
need a clear aerial line of demarcation as well as in-depth knowledge of all scheduled air 
traffic. This principle ties closely to the first layer of defense which manages the outside 
environment and depending on the asset may be considered to be a part of the first layer of 
defense. Regardless of is relative classification it is necessary to understand the flows of all 
types of traffic especially those which are allowed inside or near the line of demarcation. 
This is true for the underground plane as well. Subways and derelict tunnels run underneath 
vulnerable structures in many cities.  
3.9.3 The third layer of defense  
The third layer of defense is devoted to the direct protection of a given asset itself. It involves 
target hardening and the general reinforcement of structures themselves. This is an especially 
important factor in securing urban areas where increasing standoff distance in not an option 
and where there are high levels of traffic. The third layer of defense incorporates a variety of 
tactics discussed in detail in section 5.1. Unlike the first layer of defense the third layer of 
defense exists primarily in the physical structure of a given asset. The goal is to absorb as 
much blast damage as possible and prevent the successive collapse of a structure (FEMA 
426, 2003). In many cases the assets of a structure are limited to the people which live or 
work inside. If this is the case than vital structural elements need only remain intact as long 
as it takes for people to evacuate the structure and retreat to a safe distance. However in some 
cases it may be simply unacceptable to lose a structure due to an explosion. This is especially 
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true for government buildings, military institutions as well as others. In these cases extreme 
target hardening measures are needed. These measures are often untaken as a result of 
limited standoff distance. May urban cores and central business districts simply do not allow 
large standoff distances to exist as such target hardening is one of the few options available. 
This may involve measures such as structure enveloping, structural reinforcement, window 
replacement and more. In some cases the relocation of assets may be needed to create a 
secure site and structure. Target hardening and the tactics and technology involved is 
examined in detail in Appendix C.  
3.10 Description of Common and Innovative Anti-terror Infrastructure  
Below, some common and new and innovative pieces of urban anti-terror infrastructure have 
been listed and briefly described. By combining these elements in a well thought out way 
planners can create accessible and eye-pleasing landscapes which are safe and difficult to 








Figure 4 Hydraulic retractable bollard 
Source: FEMA 430 
Figure 3: Standard non-retractable bollard 
Source: FEMA 430 
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Essentially, a bollard is a post (usually no larger than chest height) which prevents cars from 
entering area where they do not belong. They effectively prevent vehicles from driving into 
structures and create a line of demarcation clearly displaying where vehicles do and do not 
belong. There are many variations of the bollard that come in different shapes and sizes; the 
most notable of which is the hydraulic bollard which is retractable.   
Road blockers  
Road blockers are in many ways the same as bollards however they are more practical for 
shutting down an entire street where traffic would normally flow freely. Road blockers are 
hydraulic systems which erect a small barricade that prevents cars or trucks from passing 
over them. The figure blow shows a deployed road blocker. During normal conditions the 
blocker would be down allowing traffic to pass over it virtually unnoticed. 
 
Figure 5: Road Blockers: note their ability to effectively bar auto traffic from an entire street with the 
push of a button. Source: FEMA 430 
 
Turn tables  
Turn tables are anti-ram infrastructure which allow vehicle to pass when permitted and easily 
prevent vehicles from entering an area when not permitted. They are as effective as bollards 
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in stopping vehicles and can be designed to blend into their surroundings with greater ease. 
The advantage of turn tables is that they can close a street in a matter of second and reopen as 
necessary. 
 
Figure 6: Turn tables allow security personnel to easily control traffic flow into an area and are designed 
to withstand ramming speeds from heavy vehicles.  
Source: FEMA 430 
 









Jersey barriers are precast concrete blockades roughly waist height. Originally designed as 
highway medians they have been adapted as security barriers. Although cumbersome, jersey 
barriers can be moved and placed with heavy machinery. They are usually employed as 
Figure 7: Jersey Barriers are rapidly deployable concrete barriers which can be used to bar 
traffic and people. They can be bare as seen on the right or with a fence attachment as seen on 
the left. They can also be used as temporary measures in events which demand it such as a 
visit from head of state.  
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traffic barriers but unless properly fastened to the ground even their 5700lbs at 12.5’ may not 
be enough to stop a charging vehicle (Molotch and McClain). In some circumstances 
staggered jersey barriers combined with vehicles can create effective anti-vehicle barriers 
which can be deployed relatively quickly.  
Heavy Objects and Trees  
 
Figure 8: Heavy objects and trees can from effective barriers and create clear lines of demarcation. They 
also create protective barriers without using ‘fortress architecture’ or creating landscapes of fear, this is 
especially important with the demand for aesthetically appealing security measures. 
Source: FEMA 430 
 
Large objects such as decorative boulders, trees, sculptures, fountains etc. can be used in 
much the same way as bollards. They can effectively prevent vehicles from entering areas 
and add some diversity and aesthetic quality to the monotony and arguable unsightly nature 
of mass amounts of bollards. 
Water Barriers  
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Water is one of the oldest and most effective barrier forms. Impassible by car or truck and 
difficult to cross unnoticed by swimming water obstacles can provide a perimeter security 
barrier that is effective and eye pleasing.  
Fences and walls  
Fences are a traditional and effective form of barrier which comes in a variety of forms with 
endless variations. They can deter and delay intruders and create a line of demarcation. New 
innovations in fence and wall design include motion detectors, electric fences, anti-climb and 
anti-ram fences.  
 
Figure 9: Fences, including this anti-climb example are passive security measures which can make an 
asset unreachable to foot or vehicle effectively protecting them and forcing attacks to find other way 
around it including past security points  
Source: FEMA 430 
 
Reinforced street furniture  
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Reinforced street furniture provides an aesthetically pleasing form of barrier which can be 
used to prevent vehicles from approaching or ramming their way through and can curtail the 
flow of pedestrian traffic. These elements can come in a seemingly endless variety with 
reinforced features such as seats, planters, lamp posts, sculptures etc. 
 
Figure 10: Reinforced street furniture provides aesthetically appealing solutions to traffic control for 
both pedestrians and vehicles. Almost all mundane street furniture can be reinforced to withstand a 
charging vehicle and some such as the planters above can discourage or prevent pedestrian intrusion.  
Source: FEMA 430  
Tiger Traps  
Tiger traps are innovative solutions which have traditionally been reserved for airport 
runways. The blue material situated below grass or other surface cover is a collapsible 
concrete analog which will give way under the weight of a loaded vehicle but is strong 
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enough to support pedestrian traffic, motorized scooters and the like. When installed the tiger 
trap is completely invisible and highly effective. The tiger trap will give way under the 
immense weight of a vehicle essentially sinking it into the ground, immobilizing it. 
 
 
Figure 11: When 
installed tiger traps 
provide an invisible 
anti-vehicle trap 
which effectively 
immobilizes a vehicle 
and which does not 
interfere with 
pedestrian traffic or 
traffic flow on city 
streets  
Source: FEMA 430 
Tiger traps allow pedestrians 
and motorized scooters to 
travel over them but will 
collapse under the weight of a 
vehicle 
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Chapter 4 Methods  
This thesis has adopted a case study approach utilizing content analysis from secondary 
sources.  Sources examined include, academic literature, government documents and reports 
published by professedly organizations.  This was selected as the research approach due to 
the foundational nature of the research.  Content was filtered through and searched for key 
terms.  Articles were reviewed to determine their content and validity to the overall objective 
of this research.  The content analysis approach was selected because it allows the user to 
sort through large amounts of material and identify its properties. Data was collected and 
analyzed working in reverse of the traditional scientific method to develop a theory based on 
the existing boy of data.  This research fills part of the gap which exists in this regard and 
may pave the way for more empirical research in the future.  It also allows the research 
questions posed earlier to be answered.  In order to determine the current state of the security 
planning in Canada a quantitative case study analysis is necessary.  This form of research has 
been validated by research such as Cresswell, 2009; Bryman, Bell & Teevan, 2012, Yin 
2009.  Additionally, in order to determine how planning can contribute to the security of 
urban areas, the changes in policy and design following September 11, 2001 in Canada and 
how current standards in Canada compare to those expressed in the idealized city of 
Washington D.C. secondary research was necessary.  It provides the information necessary to 
answer these questions and clearly demonstrates what actions have taken place in North 
America in the past decade to secure cities.  Documents were analyzed for content relating to 
security and ant-terrorism.  Additionally government documents were analyzed for mandates 
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pertaining to the protection of citizens and references to anti-terrorism and security. In Fact, 
Peter Eisinger of Wayne State University conducted similar research which was published in 
his 2004, Urban Affairs Review article The American City is the Age of Terror: A 
Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of September 11.  
4.1 Case Study Cities 
This research into security planning in the Canadian context focuses on Canada’s major 
metropolitan areas, specifically; Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa- Gatineau, Montreal, 
Kingston, Vancouver and Hamilton.  This purposefully sampled selection of cities represents 
a cross section of the Canadian urban population living in different jurisdictional contexts.  
Additionally, Washington D.C. represents an ideal in security and anti-terrorism planning 
and is used to set a precedent for security planning in North America and is a potential 
benchmark for Canadian cities (Schneider, 2004).  The selected cities also offer unique 
planning circumstances that influence how security planning may be conducted.  The context 
in which they exist provides additional information and insight into many different issues and 
technological solutions which are being used to adapt cities to the threats presented by 
terrorism.   
Ottawa is the center of Federal Government for the country and has developed security 
planning measures of their own to face the unique challenges which this presents.  Toronto is 
the largest city in the country and has some experience dealing with the threat of terrorism.  It 
is also a major financial engine in Canada, the capital of Ontario and is home to many 
multinational corporations and government offices.  Montreal is a large city which has had 
experience with security threats and terrorism during the separatist crises which occurred in 
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the 1970s and has hosted many high profile international events like the Olympics.  
Edmonton represents the rapidly growing prairie city which has had unprecedented growth 
and is in a position to develop anti-terrorism infrastructure.  The major fossil fuel projects 
(oil sands) situated nearby also pose a potential target and are the source of great 
environmental contention.  Kingston offers an example of a city with a large military 
presence and was once the capital of Canada before being moved due to security concerns. 
Hamilton provides an example of a moderate sized large city and it also has attempted to 
create municipal level security plans.  Finally, Vancouver stands as the hub of Canada’s west 
coast and densely populated with major international traffic flows associated with its ports.   
These representative cities are various hubs of government, finance, population and 
transportation which have been highlighted as the most likely areas to be attack by terrorists 
by many security experts.  The case study of Washington D.C. provides an excellent example 
of a North American City which has taken strong measures to secure the city against terrorist 
attacks and which has done so by using planning methods and has had significant input from 
the planning community.    
4.2 Data Collection: Documents 
The document analysis portion of the research focuses on the collection of academic articles, 
relevant news articles, professional trade journal and magazine articles and government 
documents.  Due to the foundational nature of the research a great deal of literature review is 
necessary.  Additionally in order to determine how security concerns are working their way 
into Canadian planning policy and practice the analysis of relevant documents is necessary.  
While no primary data collection is undertaken, the validity of the findings is not in question.  
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The policy review, case study and purposeful sampling approaches to research are sound and 
accepted (Creswell, 2009).  Additionally due to the relatively small amount of research in 
Canadian security planning there is a need to conduct secondary research analysis in order to 
further understand security planning in Canada.   
As Creswell (2009) suggests, the method of purposefully selecting participants or sites is a 
recognized and legitimate form of inquiry and can yield meaningful and useful results.   This 
method has been put to use in the following thesis and serves as the basis of inquiry.  
Government documents are analyzed for content relating to security planning and anti-
terrorism in purposefully selected cities and compared to the ideal North American case of 
Washington D.C.. The case study approach lends itself well to the goals and objectives of the 
research presented in this thesis.  It allows for a broad analysis of the nature of security 
planning in Canada and their comparison to what is happening elsewhere.  Interviews with 
security planners and traditional planners were not conducted for several reasons.  Time 
constraints did not allow for an extensive series of interviews and due to the nature of 
security planning, interviews with security professionals regarding the plans for urban 
defense were not realistic given their sensitive nature.  Major databases relating to planning 
and terrorism were examined in the course of data collection.  Key search terms were used to 
locate relevant scholarly articles, reports and books.  Key search terms and databases used 
can be found in Appendix E.  The research focuses on planning changes after September 11, 
2001 however historical example sand information pertaining to the development of urban 
defense systems and fortifications ranges back over thousands years beginning with the 
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agglomeration tendencies of early civilizations their development into more complex forms 
of social order and communal defense.  
4.3 Documentation 
The selection of documents is directly related to the cities examined in the research.  The 
Planning Act and equivalent policy for every province in Canada is analyzed as well as the 
official Plan for each city.  Secondary plans relating in any way to security in the cities 
examined are also analyzed.  Additionally other documents from academic and professional 
sources were used as well as a selection of news articles relating to specific terrorist attacks.  
The Risk Management Series from the Federal Emergency Management Agency provided a 
large amount of information and was the foundation for elements of the thesis.   
4.4 Policy Analysis 
Government policies including Provincial Planning Acts, Municipal Official Plans, Federal 
Canadian Acts, and government policy from Washington D.C. was examined for policy 
relating to security planning and anti-terrorism design.  Documents were scanned fro content 
pertaining to these categories and relevant material is noted and commented on. 
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Chapter 5 Results 
The first set of results addresses the research questions and the objective of understanding the 
Canadian planning response post 9/11 and the current landscape of security and planning in 
the selected case study cities.  To provide relevant context, the provincial policy scale is first 
presented and discussed.  Provincial policy is reviewed to uncover mandates and policies 
relating to terrorism preparation by the municipalities as well as support provided by the 
provinces.  Thirdly the case study cities are examined to determine what actions they are 
taking to increase security and place anti-terrorism measures in their communities.  Finally 
the archetypical security and anti-terrorism planning case study city of Washington D.C. is 
presented and Canadian examples are compared and contrasted to it.   
5.1 The Planning Act 
Section 2 of the Planning Act states; 
“The Minister, the council of a municipality, a local board, a planning board and the 
Municipal Board, in carrying out their responsibilities under this Act, shall have regard to, 
among other matters, matters of provincial interest such as… the protection of public health 
and safety” (Planning Act, R.S.O, 1990, amended 2011).  Although dealing with the threat of 
terrorism is a federal matter, it is expected that some policy from provincial governments 
would reflect greater emphasis security and matters of life safety.  What is reflected in 
provincial policy are general statements of safety and health which focus on ensuring a clean 
water supply, good public health and requirements for cities to plan for expected emergency 
and disaster scenarios.     
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The Planning Act requires that municipalities and planners be conscious of the health and 
safety threats to their respective cities and regions.  This does clearly place some onus on the 
planner to protect urban centers against threats of mass violence.  However the threats of 
terrorism and higher level security concerns are not specifically mentioned in the Planning 
Act.  When we consider the multitude of other areas of planning and municipal affairs which 
are mandated and reinforced by the Planning Act, it is not unusual to find that security and 
terrorism concerns do not find their way into lower level municipal documents such as 
Official Plan, secondary plans or even in city wide security plans which tend to deal with 
conventional crime and natural hazards.  Grouping health and safety into a single point also 
diminishes the relative importance of each and diminishes specificity related to the two very 
important issues of municipal planning.   
Additionally section 3-17 of the Planning Act further outlines the roles and responsibilities of 
municipalities and planners with respect to safety in cities.  It states: 
Standards for health and safety remain in force 
(17)  The provisions of any general or special Act and any by-law passed there under 
respecting standards relating to the health or safety of the occupants of buildings and 
structures remain in full force and effect in respect of residential property situate within an 
area of demolition control (Planning Act, R.S.O, 1990, amended 2011). 
While this has very little relevance on the threat of violence and terrorism within cities it 
does provide useful data for the analysis of how terrorism has affected the role of the planner 
in Canada.  It demonstrates that planners have retained their traditional roles in safety and 
security in the post September 11, 2001 world.  A decade after the worst terrorist attack in 
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North Americana Ontario planners have not addressed the growing and relevant concern of 
terrorism and mass violence.  The excerpts from the Planning Act demonstrate how the 
Province of Ontario sees planners playing a role in the safety of their communities.  While it 
is unlikely that it would be discouraged of planners to investigate solutions and mitigation 
measures for mass violence given their numerous roles it is unlikely that they would peruse 
this avenue of professional investigation.   
Looking at the 2011 Revised Planning Act in Ontario has demonstrated that security 
concerns have not been downloaded from the province to the municipalities in any 
meaningful way.  Planners are expected to look after the general health and safety of their 
communities however higher level security concerns remain the responsibility of the 
province and federal government.    However this is not unique to the province of Ontario.  
Manitoba for example has no reference to security in their entire Planning Act and mentions 
safety in the following capacity as a municipal responsibility: 
62.2(3)     The drinking water and wastewater management plans must  
(a) provide the analysis undertaken to confirm if the existing drinking water and wastewater 
services have sufficient capacity to accommodate any projected development set out in the 
development plan; and  
(b) set out the ways in which the planning district or municipality will ensure that, in the 
provision of drinking water and wastewater services,  
(i) health and safety will be protected,  
(ii) the environment will be protected,  
(iii) the capacity and sustainability of the sources of water on which the services rely will not 
be exceeded, and  
(iv) water conservation and water use efficiency will be promoted.  
(Planning Act, R.S.O, 1990, amended 2011). 
 
This again clearly demonstrates the lack of emphasis which provinces have placed on 
security and safety as being part of the municipality’s roles and responsibilities.   
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However it cannot be said that there is no precedent for involving urban planners in higher 
level security concerns in North America.  While the Canadian experience has been one of 
leaving planners to their traditional roles, US security and urban planning have been fused 
together in a variety of areas to create a more well rounded and well protected urban 
environment, however the reason for this are far different from those in Canada.  American 
cities have a distinct advantage in upgrading their security systems and policy due to large 
federal grants which are available to government organizations, cities and companies which 
meet the criteria.  In many places security grants are becoming part of the local economic 
strategy as they can be applied toward infrastructure developments and other futures in the 
urban landscape (Jackson, 2007).  While there is more collaboration between local levels of 
government and federal security agencies in the United States planners as a group are not as 
well acquainted with the issues which security planning creates in their cities.  While there is 
some precedent such as Project Homeland in the United States which incorporate local and 
municipal affairs into the security planning most Canadian municipalities have not adopted 
their own anti-terrorism or security plans.  Another persistent problem in sharing information 
is the mandate of many security agencies especially federal powers in the United States 
which prevent them from sharing information with local governments contributing to the silo 
effect which is so prevalent in planning and government in general.  Encouraging 
communication between local and higher levels of government will be an important factor in 
the future protection of urban areas and the integration of urban planning and municipal and 
regional level planners into the higher level security framework.  While there are few 
mandates or requirements placed on the province by the federal government there are 
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precedents of federal transfers of authority and resources to municipalities from federal 
agencies in the United States. Using a similar system to a larger degree in Canada may 
produce positive results in Canada and develop municipal infrastructure and antiterrorism 
resources further.        
5.2 Provincial Overview  
The following section provides an analysis of the provincial policy across Canada’s ten 
provinces with respect to planning.  Documents were reviewed and relevant sections 
pertaining to safety and security were analyzed to determine their impact on security 
planning at the municipal level in each province.  Across the provinces it became evident that 
higher level security concerns associated with terrorism, mass violence or the like were not 
specifically mentioned and the nature of security responsibility delegated to the municipal 
level remained quite low.  Measures to combat congenital crime were not mentioned in any 
of the planning related documents.  However most provinces have overarching or umbrella 
policies which allow planners and the local government to pass laws and create advisory 
councils pertaining to the general health, safety and welfare of the citizens of their 
community.  While there are no specific concerns which are addressed in any of these 
documents they do provide some room for the municipalities of Canada to take initiative and 
developed their own security master plans as some cities have attempted.  Through the 
analysis of the provincial documents I found that most municipal level concerns relating to 
safety and security involved insuring a clean drinking water supply and the preparation of 
natural disaster management strategies where required, most centered on local flooding.  
Other references to the handling of local wildlife concerns, municipal building safety 
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pertaining to fire and collapse also appeared in several documents.  While these have little 
bearing on the higher level security environment these polices do demonstrate again the 
attitude which the provides have taken in allowing or mandating the securing of cities against 
acts of violence at the municipal level.   
5.3 The Provincial Policy Statement 2005 
The Province of Ontario thought the powers of the Minister of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing issues policy regarding matters of provincial interest in land use planning.  These 
polices provide a general outline for the municipalities to base their plans on.  Municipalities 
are required to be consistent with the policies detailed in the Provincial Policy Statement 
2005.  With regard to safety and security the PPS protects the people of Ontario through 
broad policies such as the one listed below.   
“The Provincial Policy Statement, 2005 protects Ontario communities through policies 
directing development away from areas of natural or human made hazards where there is an 
unacceptable risk to public health or safety, or property damage” (Citizens Guide the 
Planning Act, 2010 p 4).   
 
The PPS like many other general planning policies does not fully address the possibility of 
terrorism within the city.  The PPS does have some general polices which are aimed at 
protecting the health, safety and well being of people however they fail to acknowledge the 
planner as active member of the security field. The case study of Washington D.C. 
demonstrates how urban planners have been incorporated into the security planning 
framework and how they are contributing to mitigating and preventing terrorism in urban 
areas.  Although it has been argued that security should be part of the urban planning agenda 
(Coaffee and Wood, 2006, Axworthy et al. 2006, Coaffee, 2009), it is clear that the PPS draws 
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no such conclusion   The expert from the Provincial Policy Statement 2005 below 
demonstrates the general sentiment and onus which the PPS bestows on Planning in the 
province of Ontario.   
“It is equally important to protect the overall health and safety of the population. The 
Provincial Policy Statement directs development away from areas of natural and human-
made hazards, where these hazards cannot be mitigated. This preventative approach 
supports provincial and municipal financial well-being over the long term, protects public 
health and safety, and minimizes cost, risk and social disruption”  (Provincial Policy 
Statement, 2005 p 3). 
 
While the PPS does not specifically or generally address higher level security concerns, it 
does advocate for general preparation and emphases the importance of preventative action in 
all possible planning scenarios as demonstrated in the preceding excerpt. 
Alberta 
The Municipal Government Act of Alberta allows municipalities to pass bylaws with respect 
to the safety of local residents.  Part 2 section 7a states  
council may pass bylaws for municipal purposes respecting the following matters: 
(a) the safety, health and welfare of people and the protection of people and property 
(Province of Alberta, 2010). 
 
British Columbia 
The British Columbia Local Government Act does not mention terrorism, security or safety 
in any form other than permitting local governments to alter the density of land developments 
to benefit the health and safety of local residents.  
Saskatchewan  
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The Saskatchewan Planning and development Act makes little reference of safety and none 
to security.  However section 45 which outlines the purpose of zoning b laws sates that: 
Purposes of zoning bylaw 
” The purposes of a zoning bylaw are to control the use of land for providing for the amenity 
of the area within the council’s jurisdiction and for the health, safety and general welfare of 
the inhabitants of the municipality” (Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2007). 
This section provides the municipality with the ability to make site specific evaluations and 
enforce security concerns within their area of influence to a small degree.  However there is 
no direct mention of security concerns in the act.   
Manitoba Planning Act  
The MPA makes no reference to security concerns and has only one reference to public 
safety with respect to drinking water and ensuring its quality.   
Ontario  
The government of Ontario has been placed more thought on the safety and security of 
citizens in their planning act.  Under section 2 municipalities are required to have regard for 
the protection of public health and safety.  This section requires that security concerns be 
thought about during the planning process.  Section 24 of the Ontario Planning Act requires  
“(24)  In considering a draft plan of subdivision, regard shall be had, among other matters, to 
the health, safety, convenience, accessibility for persons with disabilities and welfare of the 
present and future inhabitants of the municipality” (Government of Ontario, 2012). 
Quebec  
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The Province of Quebec is the only province in Canada which has a dedicated chapter in 
their municipal type act to safety.  Section 8 on safety is transcribed below.  This section 
provides an excellent interpretation of how some provinces view the municipality’s role in 
determining the safety and security of local municipalities.  There is no mention of higher 
level security of even of conventional crime.  Although an entire section of policy has been 
devoted to safety the level of security involved is very low and thought of mass violence has 
obviously not been a consideration.   
New Brunswick  
The province of New Brunswick like most other province has little in their provincial policy 
which would place security concerns at the top of munici9pal planning considerations like 
Alberta there is a single overarching policy which allows municipalities to create advisory 
committees and commission to determine the safety concerns on a given subject.   
Nova Scotia 
The Nova Scotia Municipal Government Act like many other provinces has the given 
municipalities the ability to Power to make by-laws for the purposes of health and safety 
section 172 a and b below demonstrate this.  The section states: 
172 (1) A council may make by-laws, for municipal purposes, respecting 
(a) the health, well being, safety and protection of persons; 
(b) the safety and protection of property 
(Office of the Legislative Counsel, 1999) 
Newfoundland and Labrador  
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Newfoundland and Labrador’s Urban and Rural Planning Act does not have any mention of 
security, safety or perception of any kind relating to crime, terrorism or general safety in it 
which municipal council and municipal planners can use to establish grounds on which to 
plan for mass violence.  This is not to say that planners and municipalities are forbidden from 
doing so however there is not mandate for municipalities to do so in any meaningful way as 
seen in other provinces throughout Canada.   
Prince Edward Island  
PEI’s Planning Act has little reference to safety and security like the rest of Canada but does 
have a section which requires developers to demonstrate safety of access and emergency 
access in their plans before construction of a given project may proceeded. These design 
criteria may prove to be a useful tool in helping to mitigate terrorist related episodes should 
one ever occur on the island.  The same section also requires that developers provide  
“method of fire protection and other emergency services; and (i) additional information as 
the Minister considers necessary. The final blanket policy allows site specific concerns to be 
dealt with however as a whole the province expects little in terms of security planning from 
its municipalities or their planners (Legislative Council, PEI 2010). 
 Reviewing the planning and municipally significant acts of each of Canada’s 
provinces demonstrates again how higher levels of government are not concerned with 
having their local municipalities involved in higher level safety issues.  The few cities in 
Canada which have had any attempted to develop their own security plans to address these 
concerns have done so largely on their own out of a feeling of necessity.  This system is 
especially important for midsized cities to consider due to the lack of funding and 
 
  67 
independent security agencies which are present in Canada’s most populace cities such as 
Toronto and Canada’s centre of government in Ottawa.  Some cities such as Hamilton 
Ontario have attempted to develop their own master security plan in the post September 11, 
2001 world however their proposed plans were never adopted and the program was shut 
down due to budgetary concerns.  This has left cities such as Hamilton and others of similar 
size relatively unprotected compared to their more populace neighbors.  While the threat of 
actual attack is relatively low in these areas and the threat to the lives of average citizens is 
relatively low there are site specific concerns in many midsized Canadian cities which 
warrant further attention.  Research in Motion’s headquarters and hub in Waterloo Ontario 
provides an excellent example.  Terrorist related violence at such a facility could hamper 
communication networks, kill many people and have adverse affects on the local and wider 
economy. 
5.4 City of Toronto Official Plan 
The city of Toronto has a variety of plans regarding the development of the city and the 
security systems which are meant to defend it.  Examination of these documents has occurred 
here beginning with the official plan for the city as well as thematic plans and other relevant 
municipal literature.   
Official plans constitute the backbone of municipal and regional planning policy.  Other 
supplementary or thematic plans play an important role in the development of cities and their 
planning policy however the official plan sets broader policy for cities and is common 
amongst municipalities and regional municipalities in Canada whereas secondary plans can 
be made on an ad hoc bases.  By that extension the official plan provides the best piece of 
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analytical information available for the research on the affects of terrorism on municipal 
planning policy. Other mechanisms for ensuring compliance with urban design standards 
such as by-laws have relevance in creating secure cities.  These however are done on a small 
scale and must conform to the overall OP.  They may have use in addressing site specific 
concerns on high value targets and may be necessary to secure areas for terrorist attacks.   
Toronto’s planning policy presents some remarkable circumstances in Canadian planning 
policy which should also be addressed in the anti-terrorism planning policy for the area.  It is 
home to the Toronto Stock Exchange, many government offices; it is the seat of provincial 
power and home to many of Canada’s largest corporations as well as a large urban 
population.  However the official plan for the City of Toronto does little in addressing the 
issue of potential terrorism.  This may be due to the framework in which the city operates.  
Due to its large size and various services as well as the influence of provincial and federal 
mandates segments of Toronto’s security have their own dedicated security management 
system.  For example; Exhibition Place, the Toronto Zoo, Toronto Parking Authority and the 
Toronto Transit Commission all have separate security agencies which.  This form of 
organization creates a staffing and logistical issue which degrades the security of the city as a 
whole.  Having a more integrated approach to security planning with more centralized bodies 
collaborating would allow for the better sharing of information, resources and expertise 
within the city. This is similar to the role of regionalism. The jurisdictions mentioned above 
are an example of disjointed services which have the potential to collaborate to a greater 
degrees to ensure security in Toronto. They are also major gathering areas, making them 
appealing targets for terrorist activity.  These concerns, while not addressed in the City of 
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Toronto Official plan are mentioned in the City Wide security plan which was proposed in 
2008, however the project was never finished and Toronto remains without an integrated 
security plan featuring planning standards and design practices leaving individuals facets of 
the city to evaluate their own risks and plan accordingly.  Survey evidence from the 
Emergency Preparedness of Canada report (2008) has determined that Toronto has 
emergency preparedness strategies in place.  However they have been developed by the local 
police department in conjunction with provincial, federal agencies as well as in cooperation 
with New York City police agencies (EPC, 2008) The fact that anti-terrorism planning is not 
more integrated in the Metro Toronto area is not surprising nor is the fact that municipal 
planning staff has not addressed it in their own plans.  The City of Washington D.C. had 
similar issues until the development of their own security plans and the creation of the 
National Capital Planning Commission’s Urban Design and Security Plan.  This is in large 
part due to the fact that terrorism response falls within the mandates of the national security 
agencies (Stewart, Pichet & Sneddon, 2010). As mentioned the realm of security planning 
has largely been deemed the responsibility of other departments (EPC, 2008).   
The City of Toronto for example has an office of Security and Life Safety Unit (Facilities & 
Real Estate Division) which oversees security concerns in the city.  The office is responsible 
for corporate security in the city which has an important role in safeguarding public property; 
however terrorism in Toronto is not mandated to them.  However larger security concerns 
such as acts of terrorism and the possibility of mass violence have not been addressed by the 
City of Toronto’s planning department in any meaningful way.  This is to say that there are 
no public sources of information available which are aimed at preventing or mitigating the 
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affects of mass violence at a municipal level in the city.  While other government agencies 
within the provincial and federal government have assessed the security risks in Toronto 
from the perspective of terrorism the city itself has done little to address the issue themselves 
and has implemented no policy design guidelines to mitigate terrorist attacks.  A survey of 
municipal literature ranging from planning documents to other internal municipal documents 
has found that security planning with respect to terrorists and mass violence has not been 
well considered in the Toronto landscape (EPC, 2008).  In 2007 when the Federal 
Government asked “How prepared is your community to respond to a major emergency or 
disaster”, Toronto Responded: “Prepared” out a list of the following options: Prepared, 
Somewhat prepared, Unprepared, Do not know.  However, planning officials were not 
involved in the preparation of the emergency response plans in place in Toronto The 
dominate reasons for may be  the availability of funding or lack thereof, the perceived low 
threat level in the city and the federal mandate on the subject security related to terrorism as 
highlighted by the EPC report (EPC, 2008).   
However as Inspector Robert Stewart of the Criminal Intelligence Service branch of the 
Vancouver Police stated at the Proceedings of the 2010 Special Senate Committee on Anti-
terrorism “Although combating terrorism falls within the prescribed mandates of our national 
security agencies such as CSIS and the RCMP, I hope to point out the critical role that local 
law enforcement plays in the overall national security environment” (Stewart et al, 2010 p 2).  
While the police have a different role than planners potentially would in defending against 
terrorist activity, the emphasis on local responses by Inspector Stewart provides a stepping 
stone for planners to enter the realm of security planning like never before. This is important 
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considering that while, the city of Toronto has experienced almost no terrorist activity which 
has been made public, and schemes to destroy structures and kill people within the city have 
been uncovered.  Police forces have been successful in thwarting any attempts by would be 
terrorists within the city.  As such the level of necessity can be perceived to be very low in 
Toronto and its metropolitan region.  This takes the onus off the planner and places it far at 
the back of their thoughts as they go about their daily duties and perform the traditional roles 
associated with urban planning in the area.  This lack of thought at the municipal level and 
amongst planners in reinforced by the fact that the city has separate security agencies 
responsible for its various municipal systems, venues and departments, leading to a lack of 
coordination and a shifting of the burden as well as possibility uncertainty of responsibility.  
The expert below from the City of Toronto City Wide Security Plan staff report in 2009 
demonstrates this well, 
“In the case of Agencies, Boards, and Commissions (ABCs), there are ABCs without any 
dedicated security management and a few with dedicated security management including 
Exhibition Place, the Toronto Parking Authority, the Toronto Transit Commission, and the 
Toronto Zoo. These ABC’s have dedicated security management and programs because of 
unique operational, physical, and legislative security requirements, as well as, for the most 
part very defined property limits. There exists little coordinated security between ABC’s and 
between ABC’s and Corporate Security” (City of Toronto 2009, City Wide security Plan Staff 
Report p 4). 
 
Urban planning in the City of Toronto has done little to address the issues associated with 
mass violence and problems which exist do to a lack of collaboration between municipal 
jurisdictions and reinforces the perspective that the threat whether real or perceived has done 
little to influence Toronto planning policy and urban form in the decade following the 
terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001.  This is not at all surprising 
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considering the relative peace which Toronto and Canadian cities in general have 
experienced.  Toronto municipal level policy lacks urban design guidelines and 
transportation security measures in the dense downtown core to prevent explosive attacks.  
Municipal planning literature has failed to reveal any guidelines or initiatives to prevent these 
sorts of attacks.  The existence of various agencies boards and commissions may be 
degrading the overall security environment by creating a complex system of beurocratic 
departments.  These ABCs were not investigated in full due to the lack of public information 
and their emphasis on corporate security at site specific levels as opposed to lager municipal 
wide planning being investigated here.    
5.5  City of Ottawa 
The City of Ottawa not unlike the city of Toronto has done relatively little with respect to the 
amendment of their official plans to address the threats presented by terrorism in the area.  
This area is especially important considering the presence of the Federal Government, United 
States Embassy and other foreign and domestic government agencies which are 
geographically clustered in core areas and throughout the city.  The absence of security 
planning by municipal employees and in the planning policy of the city is not surprising.  
Investigation into the sources of security planning documents discovered separate agencies 
within the municipal, provincial and federal government structures which have the mandate 
of protecting urban areas from terrorist activity. Similar to the case of Toronto, Ottawa has 
separate agencies which deal with the security of specific areas.  Additionally, embassies 
have their own security staff and policy to respond to threats of violence against them.  
Investigation into the city of Ottawa’s planning policy regarding terrorism and urban security 
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determined that the threat of mass violence had little effect on the city’s planning and similar 
to Toronto there has been little affect on the urban form of the city due to the threat of mass 
violence.  In fact the design guidelines for high profile buildings in Ottawa do not have any 
mention of terrorism or security.  There is a singular reference to safety in the form of bird 
safety (City of Ottawa, 2008).  While federal acts such as the Emergency Management and 
Civil Protection Act have placed mandates on cities to prepare for emergencies, anti-
terrorism design and policy has not merged with the official plans and design guidelines of 
the City of Ottawa.  Planning clearly has a role to play in anti-terrorist defenses as 
demonstrated by the planning taking place in Washington D.C.   The lack of action may be in 
part due to a lack in willingness to alter the historic nature of parts of Ottawa.  An 
unwillingness to alter heritage structures and create architecture of fear is a common 
complaint for those who oppose physical security changes in cities (Ellen, 1997).  
Additionally as previously stated in the case of Toronto the Federal government has 
identified that terrorism is a low priority objective for municipalities to deal with (EPC, 
2008).  Ottawa does have an emergency preparedness plan in place to deal with a variety of 
disaster scenarios.  However, among the responsibilities of the municipality response to 
terrorist related threats is not listed or mentioned (City of Ottawa, 2010).  The municipality 
itself is taking steps to respond to the possible threat of terrorism in the nation’s capital with 
new projects aimed at stopping chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive 
(CBRNE) threats in the city.  In 2012 the city began a pilot project of combined RCMP and 
local police assets to respond to the mentioned CBRNE threats (Hurley, 2012).  However, the 
contents of the plan mention terrorism only once in reference to forensic investigation.  The 
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CBRNE Plan for the City of Ottawa has one anomaly among other documents of this nature.  
It specifically mentions the role of the planning department in the event of a CBRNE event 
(CBRNE Task Force, 2008).  Planning, transit and the environment are placed in a single 
category and listed as a support service (S) who duties during a CBRNE even are as follows.  
1. Deputy City Manager, or representative  
2. Support response activities at the site  
3. Ensure consistent dissemination of public information  
4. Assure the continuity of services at a city-wide level  
5. Coordinate activities as a whole  
(CBRNE Task Force, 2008) 
While this task is important in dealing with a CBRNE event in the city, the report mentions 
no preventative measures or anti-terrorism measures of any kind.  It is a response plan and as 
such all city departments are listed with various duties and levels of involvement attached to 
the respective departments.  The issue of anti-terrorism or security planning i.e. proactive 
preventative and mitigation measures does not appear in publically available City of Ottawa 
literature, plans or policy including the OP of design guidelines for the various areas of the 
city.  Planning, it appears has not be taken seriously as an anti-terrorism tool in Canada’s 
Capital.   
With respect to general preparedness the city of Ottawa listed itself as ‘Somewhat Prepared’  
when asked :”How prepared is your community to respond to a major emergency or disaster” 
(EPC, 2008).  Additionally the city of Ottawa sited that their ability to plan and prepare for 
disaster scenarios was hampered by industry not being willing to share sensitive information 
out of fear that it would be available to the public (EPC, 2008).  Ottawa has identified 
deficiencies which prevent it from accurately analyzing its landscape and prepare however 
among those planning is not mentioned.  Literature review has revealed that anti-terrorism 
 
  75 
planning in the form of alterations to the built environment are valuable urban defense 
mechanism (Davis 1992, FEMA 426, 2003).  The City of Ottawa has not made these changes 
via planning policy or initiatives in the municipality.      
5.6 City of Montreal 
The City of Montreal has extensive experience dealing with terrorist activity.  The crisis with 
the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) waged a bombing, terrorism and deformation 
campaign in Montreal from 1963 until 2001.  The level activity which the FLQ engaged in 
varied over the years since its creation, however terrorist targets included McGill University 
and English businesses many of which were bombed or fire bombed.  Despite the presence of 
terrorist activity in the Province of Quebec, in the City of Montreal and on site specific 
targets the master plan for the city has done little to address the issues which decades of 
domestic and foreign terrorism has brought to the city.  This however is not to say that no 
changes to the security of the area were made in that time.  Montreal police established an 
anti-terrorism unit which was successful in the arresting of terrorists and ending much of the 
violence in the province and in the City of Montréal.  Analysis of the City of Montreal 
planning documents discovered that there was little reference to public safety and none 
related to preventing or mitigating terrorist attacks.  There are many references to safety 
throughout the Montreal Master Plan however information and policy related to safety 
centers around proper lightning in urban areas, traffic safety, pedestrian and cyclist safety.  
Montreal has indentified that it has a counter-terrorism plan in place and that is considers 
itself “Prepared” according to survey results (EPC, 2008).  The case of Montreal is similar to 
the previously mentioned cities in that police are the primary agency involved in terrorist 
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related emergencies and that planning policy and practice are not used as mechanisms to 
prepare preventative measures against terrorist attacks.      
5.7 City of Edmonton  
The City of Edmonton has the issue of security permeates through their Municipal 
Development Plan.  The MDP governs growth in the City of Edmonton over a ten year 
period and is reviewed at regular intervals similar to the official plans review for the city of 
Toronto and Hamilton.  What is uncommon in the policy and initiatives of other Canadian 
cities but which does exist in the MDP for the City of Edmonton are references to site 
specific and urban design policies and infrastructure pieces which can aid in the securing of 
the municipality against various form of crime and potential terrorism.  The policies listed 
below demonstrate forward thinking in the area of security and safety which is not common 
amongst municipal plans in other areas of the country.  
 Retrofit City owned buildings and public spaces to improve the safety and 
security of users and encourage owners of private buildings to do the same. 
 Support community efforts to apply the Safety Audit Guide for Crime 
Prevention. 
While there is no direct mention of defeating terrorism some of the strategies adopted by the 
municipality are in line with other anti-terrorism documents such as those presented by 
FEMA in their Risk Management Series of publications.  Design ideas such as aesthetically 
pleasing planters to act as vehicle barriers, retrofitting of buildings and controlling traffic are 
common themes that run through both documents.  While the intention may not have been to 
prevent or mitigate large scale attacks the city has developed some strategies to deal with 
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common issue in urban places as they relate to terrorist activity, mainly the creation of 
barriers to explosive threats.  Edmonton has made safety and security one of the key tenants 
of their MDP stating that the purpose of the downtown portion of the MDP is to  
“Ensure development in the Downtown, The Quarters Downtown and the surrounding 
central core neighbourhoods features unique, context sensitive and enduring designs and 
promotes public safety and security” (City of Edmonton, 2006 p 15).  
 
While the language of the section and policies laid out in it are aimed toward conventional 
crime prevention and ensuring accessibility of all people some elements of higher level 
security thinking are developed in the plans. 
When asked “Is a disaster or state of local emergency caused by an act of terrorism a concern 
for your community?”  The City of Edmonton responded “yes” and cited that it had a counter 
terrorism response plan; however it did not provide the details or name of the plan (EPC, 
2008).  The City did cite that Police, Fire, Paramedic, public health, local emergency 
management organizations and the municipal government were involved in the response plan 
however the province and federal government was not consulted in its creation (EPC, 2008).  
Additionally City of Edmonton urban design guidelines have not mentioned of anti-terrorism 
or higher level security strategies (Nebozuk, Kaba, Carlyle, Huberman, Whetzel & Gillet, 
2005).  There are references in the secondary plans the CPTED principles being applied 
however designing for terrorist attacks and specific policy and practices are not mentioned in 
Edmonton planning literature. (city of Edmonton, 2004).  Overall while Edmonton has some 
policy and design measures in place to deal with safety in the city it does not have measures 
in place to address the terrorist concern which it identified as being concerned with (EPC, 
2008; City of Edmonton, 2004).    
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5.8 City of Kingston 
The city of Kingston, once Canada’s Capital and moved for security reasons to Ottawa, 
stands  as Canada’s 40
th
 largest city with respect to population.  It has a unique security 
environment being home to one Canada’s two university degree granting military academies, 
The Royal Military College, several other Canadian Forces facilities, Queen’s University a 
major Canadian University and a population of 123 000 people.  The OP for the City 
however, does not address any concerns related to terrorism or any sort of mass violence.  
Section 5 of the City of Kingston Official Plan entitled “Protection of Health and Safety” has 
a goal statement of  
“To manage natural and human-made hazards in a manner that protects human life and 
health, avoids adverse effects on living areas and sensitive uses, and avoids, minimizes or 
buffers sources of pollution so that the quality of life in Kingston will be improved and 
sustained over the long term” (City of Kingston, 2006 p 64). 
Reading the section determines that man-made hazards references pipeline, the development 
of former gas stations, existing and former landfills and the like.  There are no references to 
higher level security plans or any evidence of thought of a terrorist threat in the city.  Other 
documents examined have determined that an emergency management planning is place and 
was last updated in 2010.  The plan however does not address security concerns in the form 
of anti-terrorism strategies or design guidelines for preventing or mitigating terrorist related 
activity.  The plan is largely aimed at emergency response rather than preventative measures 
and focuses on issues such as evacuation, distribution of medical services and aid, provisions 
of emergency food, lodging and clothing and other post incident response measures (City of 
Kingston, 2010) When asked how prepared the city was to face a disaster scenario by the 
Federal government, Kingston responded that it was “somewhat prepared” but could be 
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overwhelmed in the event of a disaster (EPC, 2008).  It responded “Yes” when asked it the 
threat of terrorism was considered in the city and identified that it is in the progress of 
developing a counter-terrorism plan for the city. The plan has not yet been made publically 
available or has not been completed as of the date of this thesis.   
5.9 City of Winnipeg  
The City of Winnipeg has a further developed body of policy than most municipalities in 
Canada.  Section 01-2 of the OP for the City of Winnipeg is entitled Safety and Security and 
has a set of guidelines and priorities as well as implementation polices to ensure safety in the 
city.  The OP states that:  
The Official Plan for the City of Winnipeg has The City of Winnipeg has a collaborative, 
broad-scaled and complete approach to safety and security that is making this a safer city. 
This balanced approach seeks to:  Foster social development and to collaborate on addressing 
root causes of crime. 
- Build strong relationships between communities, safety stakeholders and emergency 
personnel and law enforcement officers. 
- Build community safety capacity. 
- Provide a focused and effective community police presence. 
- Apply urban design that reduces the opportunity for crime to occur and that increases 
residents’ sense of safety. 
- Ensure that emergency preparedness, response and recovery support and services are 
available. 
 
The policies and ideas presented in the OP from Winnipeg are devoted to preventing and 
mitigating conventional crime in the city.  There is no mention of terrorism or higher level 
security thinking.  Despite this some of the ideas and policies pretend in the Safety and 
security section of the OP may lend themselves to preventing or mitigating terrorist attacks 
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however there has been no demonstration of this in the OP.  It may be the case however that 
Winnipeg has developed its Safety and Security chapter based on its high crime rate relative 
to the rest of Canada.  Winnipeg has the third highest crime rate in Canada and this may be 
the motivation for the city to develop nearly unique public safety policy in a Canadian 
municipality (Statistics Canada 2010).  What is most striking about this the fact that 
continued crime over years may have led to the development of a safety and security chapter 
in the Winnipeg OP however years of terrorism in Montreal has not done the same for 
security planning at the municipal level in Montreal.  This demonstrates the divide which 
exists in the security planning world and may demonstrate the boundaries which currently 
exist in the planning world with respect to security and safety.  When asked if the city of 
Winnipeg considered terrorism a concern for the community the municipality responded 
“yes” but identified that it did not have a counter-terrorism plan in place citing that it did not 
have the resources to work on one (EPC, 2008).  However when asked How prepared is your 
community to respond to a major emergency or disaster?  The city of Winnipeg answered 
“prepared” out of a list of the following choices Prepared, Somewhat Prepared, unprepared, 
do not know (EPC, 2008).  The OP for the city along with its urban design guidelines for 
Downtown Winnipeg only site safety as it is concerned with pedestrian safety as a concern in 
the core area.  Terrorism and security are not mentioned and there are no specific guidelines 
for anti-terrorism design in either document.  While some concerns have been worked into 
the OP as stated above, terrorism does not make its way into the planning of the City of 
Winnipeg. (City of Winnipeg, 2005).     
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Chapter 6 Discussion  
6.1 Security Planning Changes Post September 11, 2001 
In the decade following the September 11, 2001 attacks Canadian planners have continually 
advocated for denser cities which are naturally more vulnerable to explosive threats and 
where many more lives can be taken in a successful terrorist attack.  Additionally, developers 
have followed the demands and desires of the Canadian community and have continued to 
build condominium towers through major Canadian cities.  This is however not necessary 
popular amongst all security planners.  Some advocate for more decentralized cities in order 
to diffuse the threat presented to urban areas (Scott, 1969).  In contrast to this there are others 
who believe decentralization does not necessarily provide safety (Schneider, 2001) 
One notable change in the Canadian policy in the September 11, 2001 world has been the 
creation of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act.  While the Act has been in 
existence since 1990 amendments have been made as recent as 2009.  In 2002 the federal 
government updated that Act, giving more responsibility to municipalities.  The Act 
mandates that municipalities prepare emergency management plans as outlined in sections 
2.1 and 3 of the Act which are copied below: 
Municipal emergency management programs 
2.1 (1) Every municipality shall develop and implement an emergency management program 
and the council of the municipality shall by by-law adopt the emergency management 
program. 2002, c. 14, s. 4. 
Same 
 
(2) The emergency management program shall consist of, 
(a) an emergency plan as required by section 3; 
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(b) training programs and exercises for employees of the municipality and other persons with 
respect to the provision of necessary services and the procedures to be followed in 
emergency response and recovery activities; 
(c) public education on risks to public safety and on public preparedness for emergencies; 
and 
(d) any other element required by the standards for emergency management programs set 
under section 14. 2002, c. 14, s. 4. 
Hazard and risk assessment and infrastructure identification 
 
(3) In developing its emergency management program, every municipality shall identify and 
assess the various hazards and risks to public safety that could give rise to emergencies and 
identify the facilities and other elements of the infrastructure that are at risk of being affected 
by emergencies. 2002, c. 14, s. 4. 
 
This places some onus for the protection of Canadian cities against terrorism on 
municipalities themselves; however the Act does not specially mention terrorist activity 
except that it allows municipalities to refuse disclosure of information contained in their 
emergency management program if it could identify vulnerabilities and prove injurious to 
Canadians.  The Act gives municipalities the power and mandate to plan for terrorism in one 
regard.  However it requires that terrorism be identified as a threat by that municipality 
before it can be planned for.  The emergency plans of major Canadian municipalities are not 
available publically.  Terrorism and emergency protection has not made its way into the 
official plans of Canadian cities nor secondary plans which are publically available. 
Section 3 of the Act weakens the mandate to plan for terrorist activity in Canadian cities.  It 
states “In developing its emergency management program, every municipality shall identify 
and assess the various hazards and risks to public safety that could give rise to emergencies 
and identify the facilities and other elements of the infrastructure that are at risk of being 
affected by emergencies.”  This requires cities to identify the risk of terrorism as a potential 
risk to public safety in their area.  If they do not, there is not further mandate to take this 
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specially into account when preparing emergency plans for the municipality unless it is 
specifically mandated to them by the Lieutenant Governor.   
While the conditions established in the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act 
create a possible avenue of exploration for cities to better secure themselves against terrorist 
threats, little policy has been enacted to create physical changes which will secure the city 
against terrorism.  Planning policy and standards have not greatly in the examined cities to 
include anti-terrorism measures as they have in the Case of Washington.  Ideals such as those 
outlined in the FEMA Risk Management Series have not been adopted by Canadian cities as 
a standard demonstrating that while the EMCP Act allows terrorism to be taken into 
consideration at the local level the mandate has remained largely federal as demonstrated by 
the testimony of Inspector Robert Stewart before the Senate mentioned previously.  
The Act does allow cities to plan for terrorism and goes so far as to provide funding for the 
creation of emergency plans via provincial mechanisms.  The Act states “The Lieutenant 
Governor in Council may by order authorize the payment of the cost of providing any 
assistance that arises under this Act or as the result of an emergency out of funds 
appropriated by the Assembly.”  It also allows for compensation of personal property lost 
due to the implementation of an emergency plan by the province allowing the municipality to 
avoid costs incurred due to development and implementation of an emergency plan.  While 
this compensation is not guaranteed by the Act it does create a mechanism for cost recovery 
and compensation.  This demonstrates that Canada has responded to the threat of terrorism in 
the post September 11, 2001 world however those responses have not translated into changes 
in urban planning policy and practice as they have in Washington D.C..  
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The Canadian Federal Government also responded to the events of 9/11 by creating the Anti-
Terrorism Act.  The Act is largely aimed at police organizations and the expansion of their 
powers, the prevention of money laundering and other legal issues regarding, trials and the 
gathering of information.  It was created in 2001 however, many of the powers outlined in 
the act expired in 2007.  It is similar to the United States Patriot Act but does not have an 
effect of the urban planning of Canadian cities. 
Other areas have also taken the issue of security planning seriously following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  Along with Washington Los Angeles has taken preliminary 
steps to protect it tall structures from the threat of explosive attacks (Archibald, Medby, 
Rosen & Schachter, 2002).  The Building Owners and Managers Association of Greater Los 
Angeles (BOMA) commissioned the Rand corporation to analyze the threat to Los Angeles’ 
core area tall buildings.  While the study concluded with recommendations and an analysis of 
the threat to the city, what is most striking about the research conducted by Rand was that it 
was commissioned by business owners rather than the municipality or other government 
agencies (Archibald et al, 2002).  This is a clear demonstration of the seriousness of the 
threat and the measures which some private businesses were willing to take following 
September 11, 2001. Appendix D provides a more detailed description of Canadian policy 
and governmental responses to the events of September 11, 2001.  
6.2 Case study: Washington D.C.  
In order to answer the research questions presented earlier which states that an ideal security 
planning context exists and that Canadian cities are yet to achieve that level of security an 
archetypical model must be recognized.  This research as well as other academic works has 
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determined that Washington D.C. provides the detailed model of comparison which will act 
as the benchmark to determine the state of security planning in Canada.  This is further 
supported by Richard Schneider (2004) where he states 
“Preventative Strategy, in the context of anti-terrorism land use and urban design, is 
epitomized by the National Capital Planning Commission’s recently released plan for 
Washington D.C.’s monumental core area which contains a large number of potential 
terrorist targets” (Schneider, 2004 p132). 
 
Washington D.C. has a population of approximately 620 000 people as of 2011 with a work-
time population of over one million due to daily commuters.  Its metropolitan region is home 
to some 5.6 million people.  It is the Capital of the United States and acts as a center of 
governance for the country.  Washington was chosen as the archetypal case study due to its 
size, position, governmental importance and due to the purposeful security planning which 
has occurred in the city and especially due to collaboration between traditional urban 
planners and other security professionals   Additionally it has been identified in academic 
literature as both a target and as an archetype of anti-terrorism planning (Schneider, 2004, 
(Coaffee, 2006).  What’s more, Planners, architects, engineers and other general security 
experts have been involved in creating policies and plans which specifically address security 
and terrorism related concerns in the city.  These plans and policies provide the bases for 
compassion between the purposefully sampled Canadian cities and the ideal city of 
Washington D.C. being presented here.  Washington D.C. exemplifies the actions and 
success which urban planning can achieve when mandated to focus on anti-terrorism or 
security planning.     
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The City of Washington D.C. demonstrates ideal security planning in the North American 
context.  It has security concerns expressed throughout the official plan and has developed 
secondary plans to address the city’s security and anti-terrorism needs.  Washington D.C. 
demonstrates many ideals with respect to policy and initiative taken by a municipality to 
secure itself.  Additionally it demonstrates the gap which exists between Canadian cities and 
the ideal presented in the city of Washington D.C. 
Today’s global cities have become a target for terrorism (Coaffee and Wood 2006).  
Governments and their agencies have opted to fortify their cities because of the ongoing war 
on terror and the very real threat that urban areas across the world will be struck by more 
terrorist attacks. In the face of real or perceived threats action is often seen as necessary to 
attacks.  In the face of this many of the ideals and notions of what a city is are often swept 
aside as the issues of defense and security trumps all others (Coaffee, 2003). Despite its 
obvious importance, it is necessary to balance elements of security with notions of livability, 
aesthetics and the general feeling one gets when they walk the streets.  
The idea of fortifying a city in times of war is not a new notion.  It has occurred for centuries 
and is likely to continue. However, today’s wars against terrorism, drugs, organized crime 
and the like demand a new type of fortification, one which is long lasting and a permanent 
part of the physical and psychological landscape. In the past cities such as Washington D.C. 
were fortified against real or perceived threat; first in 1812, then again during the Civil War 
and World War II. In all of these instances, the planners, architects, government officials and 
other key decision makers met with little resistance as they enacted change. These events in 
history saw the American capital, a symbol of freedom and justice transformed into a 
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fortress. Military installations surrounded the White House,  National Mall.  Many public 
spaces where commandeered in the name of national defense to house troops and equipment. 
Despite these drastic changes to the built environment there was little outcry from the public. 
This may be largely due to the temporary nature of these fortifications and the notion of 
known threats in the form of traditional armies and enemies.  
Today’s war on terrorism demands permanent installations which will not impede the 
public’s ability to conduct its business and come and go as it pleases.  The necessity of 
permanent constructs comes from the long term threat faced by contemporary cities (Savitch, 
2003).  Unlike wars in the past which had definite ends and periods of peace the nature of 
today’s terrorism demands a constant vigil by security forces and subsequently requires 
robust and perpetual physical barriers to terrorism.  It is necessary to balance the issue of 
security with the issue of keeping public space public and beautiful. Contemporary writers 
such as Lisa Benton-Short and Jon Coaffee have made it clear that it is not simply enough to 
design out terrorism in cities; the streets must still belong to the people and should inspire 
and evoke feelings of safety, freedom and endless possibility, not imminent attack (Benton-
Short, 2007; Coaffee et al 2009). While the task of seamless and subtle integration is difficult 
it is necessary to ensure that planners are not overzealous in their implementation of security 
features in public areas which cause fear or anxiety. In order to establish this urban defense, 
planners must be subtle in many of their implementations blending security elements into the 
fabric of the urban landscape without impeding the public’s ability to use that space. Imagine 
the streets of Washington D.C. should people not be able to assemble in protest and made 
themselves heard. The goal is not to create a culture of fear and control but rather an ongoing 
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free culture nearly invisibly protected without obstructions as not to create unnecessary fear 
(Benton-Short, 2007; Coaffee et al, 2009).  This is further emphasized by Coaffee, O’Hare 
and Hawksworth (2009) where they state:  
“While security regimes may attempt to ‘transmit’ feelings of safety and security through the 
built environment and to reassure the public, the ‘reception’ of these very same messages 
may be ‘lost in translation’. Ironically, for example, security features can arouse feelings of 
fear and anxiety by drawing attention to the fact that one’s safety and security is threatened. 
As such, it is argued that the strategies of the past will not meet the needs of contemporary 
cities” (Coaffee et al, 2009). 
 
This demonstrates the need for a seamless integration of security infrastructure into the urban 
realm where attention is not drawn to it and where it can be seen to serve dual functions.  
Some example of physical barriers in the form of planters, trees and other previously detailed 
in the previous sections exemplify this principle.  This is especially important given the need 
for permanent installations according to many security planners.   
The wars we are currently engaged in have no foreseen end and no defined enemies. As such 
it will not suffice to create rings of steel and fortifications around monuments, government 
institutions and financial centers (Coaffee et al, 2009). Contemporary urban planners have a 
new toolbox filled with an array of subtle tactics which will help mitigate the potential 
effects of terrorism without impeding the public’s ability to do as they will and without 
invoking fear.   
6.3 Demonstrating the Ideal Washington D.C. 
Since September 11, 2001 the Washington National Mall has been secured against terrorist 
attacks through the use of various urban design, and passive/active security measures.  
According to scholars the National Mall demonstrates the ideal in urban development and 
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design to prevent terrorist attack and retain the aesthetics and function of the area (Schneider, 
2004).  This new form of planning comes from a position of being perceived as poor 
planning and being ridiculed by visitors and residents alike (Coaffee et al, 2009). 
“Initiatives in Washington D.C. were unpopular with visitors and planners, and it has been 
asserted that ‘the nation’s capital has become a fortress city peppered with bollards, 
bunkers, and barriers’ owing both to a lack of funding for ‘anything nicer’ and a lack of 
strategic coordination between policymakers (Benton-Short, 2007, Caoffee et al, 2009).   
 
 
Figure 12: Security around the Jefferson Memorial post September 11, 2001. Media outlets would state 
that occurrences such as this made the United States look like a "nation of fear" contemporary planning 
and technology seeks to prevent such occurrences while maintaining security. 
Source: Benton-Short 2006 
 
Following the 9/11 attacks Washington D.C. was secured with mass amounts of jersey 
barriers, fencing and militaristic type security measures.  Examples from the new and 
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reformed plan which aim to prevent militaristic type defensive measures and retain aesthetics 
and community ideals are demonstrated below. Figure 13 demonstrates some of the 
aesthetically appealing forms of target hardening and visually softer defensive measures 
which are being proposed for the Pennsylvania Avenue area in Washington D.C. New 
materials and innovations in security infrastructure area allowing areas to remain secure 
while preventing fortress style architecture from dominating the landscape.  The example 
below as well as the National Capital Districts District Redevelopment Plan strongly 
reinforces many of the ideas and recommendations for site defense presented by FEMA as 
detailed in the above sections.  The plan outlined by the national Capital Commission 
provides an excellent example of plans which could be developed at the municipal and 
regional level in Canadian Cities.  What is important to note is that the NCC security plan 
was developed much like official plans and secondary plans which are required in every 
Canadian city.  Stakeholder input was taken into consideration and local planners and 
consultants developed the plan based on the needs and wants of the community.  This is 
completely within the scope and means of local planners in Canadian communities.  
Considering the role which secondary plans and urban design already play in Canadian 
municipalities, what is missing is the mandate and will to create secondary security plans 
such as those seen in Canadian cities relating to other issues such as transportation, economic 
development, urban design and other local secondary plans or the integration of security into 
existing plans such as those listed above the OPs for respective communities.    
The goal statement presented by the NCC demonstrates an attainable goal for many Canadian 
cities. It states;  
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“The goal of The National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan is to seamlessly 
incorporate building perimeter security into a beautifully designed streetscape. The Plan 
broadens the palette of perimeter security elements into an attractive streetscape, including a 
range of street furnishings and elements, such as streetlights, walls, planters, fences, and 
seats. These elements have been studied to determine the feasibility of "hardening" them so 
that they function as both amenities and as components of physical building perimeter 
security. The structural design, spacing, shape, and detailing of the perimeter security 
components must be designed to address the required level of protection for a particular 
building” (NCPC, 2004 p9). 
 
This statement clearly outlines goals and criteria which planners at the municipal and 
regional level are able to understand, implement, design, build, maintain and monitor.  
Below, diagrams have been clipped from the plan and demonstrate the visual portions of the 
plan which were developed by planner and consultants.  The language and diagrams present 
in the redevelopment plans for Washington bear a striking resemblance to secondary plans 
developed in Canadian cities.   
 
Figure 13: An example of a possible redesign for Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C. which 
integrates new design concepts which retain aesthetics while creating a secure perimeter and preventing 
the entrance of vehicles and creates a clear line of demarcation.  
Source: The National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan 2002 
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The above diagram demonstrates one possible redesign for Pennsylvania Avenue leading to 
the White House in Washington D.C..  This diagram demonstrates site specific changes 
which planners are making to protect a historic and important public realm in the Untied 
States.  Developing these site specific plans are excellent examples of how changes to the 
public realm can make the city a safer place and even improve the aesthetic character of the 
area in the process.  It is a demonstration of progressive planning in the security planning 
field, incorporating design measures which are pleasing to the eye but which also have added 
security benefits.  These changes are not so dissimilar to earlier planning movements 
including city beautiful, Broken Window Theory, and Defensible Space Theory all of which 
were planning movements from the past and which held the idea of safety and aesthetics at 
their core.         
In conjunction with its plans for public areas the City of Washington D.C. has also 
incorporated security measures into their comprehensive plan for the city.  (the 
comprehensive plan is much like a Canadian official plan in most cities), Washington D.C. 
presents a new and innovative example of security planning which could be replicated in 
Canadian cities.  The excerpt below from the transportation chapter of the Washington D.C. 
Comprehensive Plan demonstrates how security concerns have permeated throughout their 
plans and how guidelines have been created to deal with security concerns throughout the 
city.  
“The District is planning a series of preferred truck routes; a zone in the heavily congested 
and security-sensitive downtown area, from which large trucks would be prohibited during 
the business day; and truck prohibitions on all other roads unless travel on the street is 
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necessary for the truck to reach its destination. The truck system will be planned in 
consultation with federal agencies” (Washington D.C. Comprehensive Plan, 2007 c7 p27)). 
 
This one instance demonstrates the thought being placed in security and the cooperation 
between various levels of government in securing the city against various threats.  Security 
concerns are addressed in the subsections of the plan and demonstrate clear thought on the 
subject.  In addition to the plans and policies mentioned, Washington D.C. has a district 
response plan with an expressed purpose: “The DRP establishes the framework for District 
government entities to respond to, recover from, and mitigate an emergency in a methodical 
and efficient manner that protects life and property and ensures public safety” (DRP, District 
of Columbia, 2011). 
Washington  demonstrates an idealized example for Canadian cities to follow.  The official 
plan of Washington D.C. has a variety of section and chapters relating to security including 
those which try and implement stronger security measures in the community and others 
which are aimed at creating cities which are safe and livable.  The following excerpt 
demonstrates one such concern, trying to balance aesthetics and security.  Section D-3.2 of 
the Washing D.C. CP opens with; 
“Security has always been a factor in the design and development of Washington, D.C., 
particularly around government and military facilities. The influence of security on the 
landscape has taken on new significance in the last five years, however. Some of the anti-
terrorism measures implemented since 2001 have adversely affected the visual quality of the 
city. For example, the barriers around the city’s monuments and closure of key streets 
around the US Capitol convey a harsh and militaristic image that detracts from the beauty of 
the city’s most important structures. The reality is that security-conscious design is here to 
stay. The challenge facing the city now is to accommodate security needs without conveying 
the image of a city under siege” (Washington D.C. Comprehensive Plan, 2007 c9 p32).   
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It has demonstrated consideration of various security concerns at multiple levels and has 
policies and practices in place which address both the protection of the public and private 
realm while retaining aesthetic appeal and function within the city.  It has demonstrated a 
commitment to produce urban forms which are conducive to living and working in and has 
done so in a largely historical and heritage planning situation.  What makes Washington D.C. 
an excellent example for security planning is the comprehensive nature of security in 
Washington.  The Washington D.C. website for example has a Public Safety Page which 
provides information on various safety threats including:  bioterrorism, emergency planning, 
evacuation routes, Terrorism as well as other safety and security concerns.  This is unlike the 
Canadian examples which have been analyzed and demonstrates the strong security 
foundation which has been created in Washington.  The language of the plans recognizes the 
deficiencies which have existed in the past and the processes necessary to remedy the effects 
of the hasty action taken in the immediate post September 11, 2001.   
Comparing the selected cities to the cease study of Washing D.C. brings to the surface many 
of the deficiencies which exist in the planning framework of Canadian cities.  There is a clear 
separation of anti-terrorism planning and thinking in the Canadian government and fractured 
provincial, regional and municipal level security forces.  The case study of Washington D.C. 
has demonstrated that planners are capable of bridging this gap and creating safe urban 
environments which deviate away from architecture of fear (Ellen, 1997).  As the creators of 
the Urban Design and Security Plan for Washing D.C. stated the system which was in place 
following September 11, 2001 was a fractured one with few agency members’ 
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communication to one another.  Canadian cities have a similar disconnect as do regional and 
municipal level police forces.  What the case of Washing D.C. demonstrates is the ability to 
overcome this logistical and policy problem and create sound and viable plans for the 
protection of the urban realm while allowing it to retain its character and appeal.  What is 
also demonstrated in the Washington D.C. case is the prevalence of urban planning in the 
creation of anti-terrorism plans.  The policies and plans which are present in Washington 
were developed in a similar fashion to plans here in Canada with input from stakeholders, 
analysis by experts and the formulation by planners and others.  The Urban Design and 
Security Plan for Washington D.C. specially mentions that the plan was made with input 
from professional planners and as stated the language, graphics and maps found in the plan 
and in the Washington D.C. Comprehensive Plan and extremely similar to those found in 
OPs and secondary plans in Canada.  The conclusions from this evidence are now easily 
made.  Canadian planning divisions in municipalities, regions, provinces and in private firms 
have the skills necessary to develop security plans in a logical and meaningful way however 
federal mandates and a lack of perceived responsibility at lower levels of government stands 
in the way of locally developed security strategy.  Evidence from Washington’s national 
capital redevelopment which included work from planner and municipal officials 
demonstrates that the profession is open to security planning and that practitioners are 
capable of learning and adapting to the changing nature of urban development and special 
circumstances. However, there is confusion amongst municipalities as to who holds 
responsibility for the development of terrorism response plans and where the funding should 
come from. (EPC, 2008)  In order to have locally created secondary plans or have security 
 
  96 
planning incorporated into official plans planners must arm themselves with knowledge, best 
management practices and technology which have been presented in this thesis and local 
political will must push forward the idea that anti-terrorism planning can be conducted 
locally and can make meaningful contributions to the security environment without 
compromising the necessary and amiable qualities of the city.  
6.4 Discussion: Reactions to September 11, 2001 
6.4.1 Discussion: Academic Response 
Following the events of September 11, 2001 some academics warned of an end of urban life 
as we knew it (Eisinger, 2004). Some scholars and prolific writers on urban affairs warned 
about a return to citadel cities with dense fortification networks and persistent surveillance 
along with a flight to the diffused suburbs (Marcuse, 2002; Berube and Rivlin, 2002; 
Frainstein 2002; Kantor, 2002).  Other writers would argue that the overall affect of 
September 11 on city life would be negligible (Savitch, 2003).  Some authors such as James 
Harringotn and Phillipe martin (2002) would argue that cities are far more resilient than other 
scholars believe and that the agglomeration tendencies of business would prevent mass 
diffusion and decentralization.  They argued that the benefits of agglomeration would 
overcome what Eisinger call the “tax of terror” (Eisinger, 2004; Harrington and Martin 
2002).  September 11, 2001 created a variety of opinions on anti-terrorism planning in urban 
areas and how it should be conducted.  Many academics would argue for more security while 
others spelled the end of dense urban life as we know it.  Debate continues, however the 
discussion launched by September 11, 2001 has demonstrated that terrorism and planning are 
not relegated to spate silos and that low frequency high impact manmade disasters such as 
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terrorist attacks are conceivable and plans should be in place to react and prepare for them 
(Coaffe et al 2004, Chenoweth and Clarke 2010).   
6.4.2 Discussion: Government Response  
The Immediate government response to the attacks also plays an important role in assessing 
the impact on urban form in cities.  American cities belonging to the American League of 
Cities reported the immediate securing of water supplies, placing of guards at critical 
transportation infrastructure facilities and government buildings.  Additionally hospitals were 
placed on standby for mass causality events and officials gathered to discuss emergency 
plans (Eisinger, 2004; Pionke, 2001).  Research by Pionke (2001) following the attacks of 9-
11 discovered that 81% of American cities with a population of 100 000 people or larger had 
a terrorism response plan in place and 56% of cities 10 000 -100 000 citizens had terrorism 
response plans in place.  Similar surveys conducted by the Canadian Government first in 
2004 and again 2007 found that Canadian cities are not well prepared and that few of the 
municipalities surveyed (92 municipalities with 20 000 people or more were surveyed) were 
prepared to respond to various threats including terrorism.  In fact according to the 
Emergency Preparedness Report published in 2008 by the Federal Government (referred to 
as EPC hereafter) only 36% of Canadian cities surveyed had a counter-terrorism plan in place 
(EPC, 2008).  Additionally only 61% of Canadian cities reported even considering a “disaster 
or state of local emergency caused by an act of terrorism as a concern for their community” 
(EPC, 2008).  The report moves onto mention that the 36% of cities which reported having 
terrorism plans in place by be even lower given that Canadian cities do not see terrorism as a 
risk to their communities (EPC, 2008).  The survey and report by the Federal government 
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determined that emergency events are low frequency and high risk events which Canadian 
cities are generally ill equipped to handle (EPC, 2008).  The report goes on to mention the 
following: 
“Emergency preparedness is a vital issue for municipalities, but it is not one of these 
omnipresent issues. It is largely hidden in the shadows as people go about their everyday 
lives. Most municipalities are simply unlikely to siphon off their own budgets for major 
overhauls to emergency preparedness – even if a reassessment has shown that they should. 
Emergencies are low probability, high-impact possibilities. Most homeowners purchase 
insurance for low-probability, high-impact events, which is the rational thing to do. But 
somehow that often doesn’t translate into politics, and a lot of emergency prevention money 
doesn’t get spent until after a disaster, when emotions, rather than reason, rules the day. 
Unless a municipality can attract a timely injection of federal or provincial funds for 
emergency preparedness when a clear case can be made for improvements, those 
improvements will either not be made, or will not be made when they should be made” (EPC, 
2008). 
 
 The 92 polled Canadian municipalities report a lack of funding and experts necessary to 
properly protect their cities.  Major staffing complaints were reported in 2004 and again in 
2006 when both phases of the survey were completed.  The report also determined that “The 
roles federal, provincial and municipal police play during emergencies are not always clear, 
particularly if terrorism is involved” (EPC, 2008).  The survey of Canadian cities has 
discovered that terrorism is not of great concern to Canadian municipalities and that 
relatively few municipalities are preparing for the possibility of terrorist attack in their 
community. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City the Canadian 
Government created Public Safety Canada which has the mandate of keeping Canadians safe 
from a wide range of threats (PSC, 2012).   Many municipalities in Canada have also 
expressed concern around the availability of expertise in their communities concerning 
security and anti-terrorism mitigation.  When this issue is compared to the American 
examples a stark difference can be seen.    
 
  99 
FEMA and a variety of organizations have published work on terrorism mitigation strategies 
and while the work is comprehensive and enlightening much of the literature on the subject 
lacks advice surrounding the topics of protecting support infrastructure and quarantining 
individuals in the event of a successful attack.  In the wake of contemporary terrorism it is 
not simply enough to guard our population centers. In the past planners and security experts 
focused on “designing out terrorism” especially in urban centers and around financial 
institutions where economic and social damage can be the greatest (Coaffee 2006). The idea 
that asset management must cover a broad range of structures and areas is more important 
today than it has been in the past due to the targeting of civilian structures by terrorists. This 
is especially true for outlying urban infrastructure which may become the next major target 
of terrorist activities. Unlike major cities which have a multitude of eyes, ears and video 
cameras the outskirts of cities where many critical structures and systems lie remains nearly 
ungraded. The lack of activity and security in these areas forces planners to reassess the three 
layers of defense and plan a secure environment for urban support infrastructure. This will 
likely focus on stop and deterrent and deflection tactics with perhaps some supplementary 
reinforcement. Moving forward into the future defense planners will need to address these 
issues, especially in regards to structures such as dams, power plants and water treatment 
facilities. The scenario where mass numbers of people are dying of an unknown malady and 
where experts are unsure why may be just around the corner as terrorist’s aptitude for 
poisoning water improves. This would likely incite hysteria, mistrust and cause loss of life 
and economic damage. It also shuts down many of the operations within a city which require 
water such as hospitals (da Conceicao, 2009). As the technology and scientific skill of 
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terrorist organizations improves more sophisticated delivery and dispersal methods of death 
agents will likely become available to them. The future may require more than simply 
bollards, and turntables to help mitigate attacks, a holistic shield of protection and 
organization which envelopes cities and supporting infrastructures may be called for (Bosher, 
2009). In order to protect support infrastructure planners would have to carefully analyze the 
three layers of defense and implement selected tactics and constantly assess new 
technological solutions which are available. Much of these selected tactics will likely be 
implemented on a need and ease of implementation bases as previously mentioned. They will 
also have to focus on preventing various types of attacks and should be broad in their 
protective scope. It may be necessary to employ nearly all the aforementioned tactics to 
protect urban support infrastructure, and depending on the severity of the threat perhaps level 
4 and 5 measures which require years of planning, funding and development.    
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Chapter 7 Conclusions  
This thesis has demonstrated that planning; through the implementation of infrastructure and 
passive security as well as policy changes has the ability to make urban areas safer by 
deterring, preventing or mitigating terrorist attacks. The case study of Washington D.C. 
demonstrates real world changes which urban planners are making in order to combat the 
threat of terrorism in their local areas and that planning has the capacity for security 
planning.  Works by Oscar Newman, most notable his Defensible Space Theory (1972) 
demonstrate that through manipulations in built form and morphology planners can play a 
role in the securitization of cities.  Further dialogue and work by Deborah Cowen, Amy 
Sicilano and Neil Smith demonstrate that planners are actively studying security planning 
and applying it in municipal settings in Canada.  Their conclusions demonstrate that while 
terrorism falls under the realm of national security, it is “being managed within urban space 
in a number of different forms” (Cowen, Sicilano and Smith 2010).  With respect to the post 
September 11, 2001 world, this thesis has reveled that while the federal government took 
immediate and long term measures to ensure security in Canada (detailed in Appedix E), 
municipal level security initiatives are rare and under developed.  Some information on 
security planning measures taken by major municipalities is unavailable due to the secret 
nature of the information; however surveys of Canadian municipalities have reveled that 
most do not have terrorism response plans in place and many consider the financial and 
technical burden of preparing for terrorism to be a poor use of scare resources.  This 
conclusion leads to the next; Security planning in Canada is under developed when compared 
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to countries such as Great Britain and the United States.  The Case study of Washington D.C. 
demonstrates this well. This information plays directly into the previous conclusion which 
this thesis draws; many Canadian cities have not prepared themselves due to fiscal and 
expertise based restraints.  When compared to other countries Canadian standards and 
practices fall short.  Research in this thesis has demonstrated that municipal and regional 
planning in the United States is much more security focused and the link between federal 
institutions and local municipalities is much stronger.   
The review of U.S. policy documents in this thesis has revealed that there is great potential 
that urban planning policy and the implementation of area and site specific anti-terrorism 
planning can prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks.  In line with the scope of this thesis the 
case study of Washington D.C. demonstrates the planners and the planning profession have 
the capacity to meaningfully contribute to the security of cities.  American planners have 
been doing so for some time being forced to refer to Department of Homeland Security 
guidelines when making major design decisions.  Mandated consideration has forced 
planners in the United States to consider security planning in their urban designs and is 
creating a new generation of planners which is more security savvy and perhaps critical of 
the securitization of the city.  While the same requirements have not been made of urban 
planners in Canada, American policy and practice have demonstrated that urban planning has 
the capacity to incorporate security planning into it.  The Creation of urban security zones in 
major U.S. cities as well as requirements to consult department of homeland Security design 
guidelines demonstrate that planners have the ability to participate in security planning and 
can be an integral part of the effort to create safe cities.  American policy and government 
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publications demonstrate that urban planning and the alteration of the built is being used as a 
tools tool to deter, prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks.  However, stark differences reveal 
themselves between the Canadian case and the American experience with security planning 
in cities.  There is larger cooperation between cities and the federal government in the United 
States and funding opportunities which allow municipalities to receive funds for anti-
terrorism infrastructure and studies.  Additionally the American experience with terrorism 
has been much more severe than in Canada.  Events such the Oklahoma City bombing which 
killed 168 individuals as well as the September 11, 2001 attacks along with greater public 
and private interest in anti-terrorism planning have created a more security focused local 
governments that in Canada.  The example of Las Angeles provides an excellent example, 
where 40% of the city has been designated a secure zone and where the Building Owners and 
Managers Association of Greater Los Angeles privately commissioned security studies of tall 
structures in down town Las Angeles (Nemeth, 2009).  Canadian security planning has been 
largely driven by governments and focuses heavily on government owned facilities such as 
ports, rail lies and transportation networks.  Canadian security planning has also largely 
involved policy and practice changes without changes to the built environment in many cases 
such as the arming of Sky Train guards in British Columbia and Canada Border Services 
agents at border crossing.  This is not to say that there have been physical changes in 
Canadian cities however their scale and public visibility as well as affect on people’s daily 
lives has not been as great.  One need only look at the mentioned changes to the National 
Mall in Washington or the creation of “rings of steel” following September 11, 2001 around 
national monuments and perceived high value targets.  The Canadian planning experience 
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has not seen a such a centralized mandate for security considerations nor has the federal-
municipal relationship on the subject been developed to the same degree as it has in the 
United States. Again, the American contextual differences have greatly influced their 
perceptions of a secure environment  and their experience with terrorism may be the leading 
factor in the more stringent security environment which has come into existence in the 
United Sates post September 11, 2001 but which has not manifested itself to the same degree 
in Canada during the same time frame.  This thesis has also demonstrated that federal 
publications such as those published by FEMA have placed tools in the hands of local 
officials who are better able to apply micro analysis to their most vulnerable urban weak 
points and areas of profound vulnerability.  The work of planners and other officials working 
in Washington D.C. demonstrates this well.  However comprehensive Canadian examples of 
similar work, collaboration and attention to the issue of security are not readily present.  This 
may serve a disservice to the Canadian people who do not have local officials engaged in the 
security conversation as their American counterparts are.  However objectivity must also 
bring forward the argument that more security is not necessarily better in the Canadian 
context.  Funding for programs, studies, education, and implementation of strategy devoted 
to anti-terrorism is not necessarily the best use of scarce resources in every Canadian 
municipality.  Some are more vulnerable than others and some are more likely targeted than 
others.  As with many aspects of governance and life resources are often be used to do the 
greatest good possible.  In the northern areas of Ontario for example there is little concern 
over the possibility of a terrorist attack and scarce resources are more badly needed to protect 
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against natural hazards.  Ted McCullough Community Emergency Management Coordinator 
and Fire Chief for North Bay Ontario reported to the federal government that;  
“There should be more emphasis put into projects that reflect the real need of communities . . 
. There has been too much emphasis given to HUSAR and PERT and those types of entities 
with the focus on terrorism. It has come abundantly clear over the past few years that the 
real threat to municipalities is the weather. If you look at the costs associated with disasters 
within the country it has not been terrorism but mother nature. This is not to say that we 
cannot be diligent in our efforts towards terrorism but to many people are profiting from it 
and to much money is being spent on it when the real killer has been the weather.”  
(EPC, 2007) 
 
Only 36% of Canadian municipalities have reported to the federal government that there I a 
counter terrorism plan in place in their community (EPC, 2007).  Of those, the federal 
government suspects that many of the plans have not been updates in some time.  What the 
testimony of officials such as Chief McCullough demonstrates is the general lack of received 
threat which many Canadian municipalities have toward terrorism in their locale. This 
opinion is not shared by all municipalities especially larger cities such as Toronto which have 
experience with terrorism in their local area.  One important distinction surrounding the topic 
of anti-terrorism planning in Canada is its association with emergency management.  The 
goal of this body of research has not been to critically analyze the response of EMS 
personnel to terrorist attacks or deal with the aftermath of an attack but to analyze policies, 
procedures, laws and case studies to investigate how terrorism has changed Canadian urban 
planning and how changes in the built environment can prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks.  
A common misconception is the notion that anti-terrorism planning is intimately connected 
with counter terrorism which is its own and unique element.  While the testimony of 
professionals such as Chief McCullough brings forth valid points on the allocation of funding 
what is often misconstrued in the anti-terrorism debate is its ability to be seamlessly 
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integrated into the fabric of urban areas with little more funding that which already exists.  
Site plans, building permits and the like must pass through analysis and inspection in 
Canadian municipalities as it stands.  Street furniture, bollards, planters, trees and other 
features of public areas are carefully analyzed and placed as part of the redevelopment 
processes across Canada.  With more information available and strong mandates in place 
planners can easily apply simple principles such as increasing standoff distance and   
Analysis of the Canadian landscape and its comparison to what academic literature has called 
the “ideal” in Washington D.C. has revealed that Canadian cites are taking far fewer steps in 
preparing urban areas against the threat of terrorist attack.  Information gathering by the 
Canadian government in 2004 and again in 2008 has revealed that most Canadian cities do 
not have “counter terrorism” plans in place and that many Canadian cities simply do not have 
the resources to adequately deal with the threat that they may face.  Additionally many 
Canadian municipalities are simply not concerned with the threat of terrorism in their local 
area.  Other threats to public safety such as extreme weather have been cited as being more of 
a concern to their communities.  This is especially true in smaller Canadian municipalities 
where the threat of terrorism is considered very low.   
Despite the level of or perceived or realized threats across the spectrum of Canadian cities 
the affects of terrorism on urban areas has clearly been demonstrated throughout history and 
in recent events such as the attacks in New York in 2001.  Terrorism successfully disrupted 
the commercial space market in the city leading to a diffusion of offices and commercial 
activities through the New York area.  Additionally the attacks caused massive loss of life 
and disrupted the global economy.  What has also been demonstrated in the aftermath of 
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attacks such as this and others around the world is the importance of built environment 
changes in order to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks in urban areas.  The City of 
Washington D.C. has demonstrated this well in the built form changes as demonstrated in the 
above section and the diagrams and in Appendix A below which demonstrates new 
technology and built form changes which are helping to mitigate and prevent terrorist attacks 
in urban areas.  However new changes in the built form are far different from the “rings of 
steel” witnessed areas such as Washington D.C. post September 11, 2001 or in London 
during the IRA crisis.  The emphasis on new security especially passive security is the 
minimization of architecture of fear and overt displays wherever possible.  New seamless 
integration into the built environment where stark concrete barriers are replaced by planters, 
hydraulic bollards and generally more astatically appealing barriers and other forms of 
invisible protection.  What has also been demonstrated through the development of municipal 
security plans such as those developed in Washington D.C. is the contribution which 
planners can make in securing the urban environment against terrorist threats while ensuring 
functionality and esthetics are retained.  They offer balance and can make significant 
contributions and have intense local knowledge. Planners have the skills necessary to prepare 
their respective environments against many of the threats presented by terrorism.  This is 
especially true making changes to the form of a city and altering or adding to the existing 
infrastructure.  Following the events of September 11, 2001 the Canadian government took 
various methods to secure Canada against the threat of terrorism however these initiatives are 
not well reflected in the planning policy of the Canadian provinces or in the policy of 
regional and municipal government. This thesis, through the analysis of the security planning 
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landscape in Canada has revealed that most cities do not have terrorism response plans in 
place nor do most cities consider it a reliable threat to the safety and well being of their 
residents or infrastructure. While many Canadian cities have addressed emergency 
management in their local policy and some cities have considered the threat of terrorism to 
their municipality, communication between security planners and traditional urban planners 
has been low. This may be one of the reasons that Canadian security planning has not 
matched the preparation and planning of ideally planned cities such as Washington D.C. as 
previously demonstrated.  However, despite the lack of the security planning being 
implemented in Canadian cities by traditional urban planners many municipalities have 
argued that terrorism is not a significant threat to their jurisdiction and have opted to allocate 
their resources elsewhere.  Some municipalities have also cited a lack of local knowledge on 
the subject as a reason for being deficient in their terrorism preparedness. On the policy and 
academia side of the planning debate planning trends such as smart growth which have 
advocated for more dense forms of urban living have been called into question in the face of 
terrorist attacks.  Study by the Center for Immigration Studies cited terrorism as one of the 
factors contributing to decentralization in the United States.  The post September 11, 2001 
report states “If indeed both residents and workers in tall buildings around the country feel 
insecure after the toppling of the twin towers at the World Trade Center, it is possible that 
demand for the construction of future skyscrapers will decline.”  Contrasting policies 
opinions on the subject have divided some practitioners of the security profession, leaving 
some calling for more decentralized cities and lower levels of firm agglomeration (Beck, 
Kolankiewicz and Camarota, 2003).       
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Chapter 8 Future Research 
Future research on the topic of urban planning and urban security against terrorist attacks and 
how it affects planning policy and subsequently urban form will involve a variety of facets.  
Future research will proceeded from secondary research which has demonstrated that mass 
violence and terrorist attacks are unlikely to greatly affect the form of cities and have done 
little to change the face of urban planning in Canada and more broadly in North America.  
Although the United States has a much stronger security culture and the emphasis on 
localities dealing with higher level threats is somewhat greater.   
Future exploration of the topic will involve more primary research, gathering information 
from practicing planners and security experts as to why the conclusions of my research have 
occurred.  Movement toward more primary research will be the natural evolution of my 
research which required secondary research as a foundation given the lack of prior research 
on the subject and the issue of gathering security information.  Information gathering on the 
subject of terrorism will be difficult to come by given the secretive nature of much of it and 
the general unwillingness of security planning practitioners to speak openly about their 
experiences and thoughts on the subject.  However with extensive time and effort as well as 
more cross border analysis it may be possible to gather a sufficient amount of primary 
information as a researcher.  With this fact in mind I foresee the breadth of my research 
widening to a greater degree to perhaps focus on more conventional crime or focusing my 
attention on other areas of the world which do not share Canada’s record of peace and 
prosperity.  A comparison and contrast or independent research into conflict zones such as 
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Afghanistan, the Korean border area, Iraq or other areas with a long history and continuing 
mass violence may provide a more fruitful study area for the effects of terrorism on urban 
planning.  Additionally I may choose to focus on the North American context to an even 
greater degree looking at the fortification of sensitive areas such as government agencies, 
political centers, military bases etc.  A site specific contrast against the general Canadian 
policy and North American landscape examined in this paper may provide more information 
on how smaller more defined areas are coping with the threat. Additionally there is the 
possibility of examining other effects of terrorism on urban life such as the psychological 
effects of fortress architecture, the economic burden protection places on the public and other 
facets of terrorism preparation which can be directly related to urban planning.  Another area 
of future research will revolve around the security planning which higher levels of 
government are doing on behalf of municipalities and regions through tout Canada, how this 
varies across provincial jurisdictions and how federal agencies are managing the planning of 
secure environments in Canada against terrorist threats.   
I believe that far more information exists on this topic seeing as relatively little is being done 
at the municipal and regional levels across Canada.  How these agencies are operating and 
determining the form of Canadian cities could provide a multitude of useful information 
however the sensitive nature of some of it may preclude further research in this area by 
outside researches which are not part of the security establishment.  Additionally, local 
security can also be examined from an emergency management point of view and from a 
police perspective to determine how they are responding to the threats which Canadian cities 
face and how this affects the overall form and function of Canadian cities.  
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Chapter 9 Postface 
Government agencies need to be aware of the threats which face critical facilities such as 
water treatment stations, electrical grids and the like. Equally important is the planning for 
the successful execution of these types of attacks. Contingency plans are necessary as there 
will be a successful attack on vital facilities at some point in time. In line with the cliché, we 
must recognize that it is not a question of if but when. Proper planning of response 
infrastructure and an emergency personnel strategy will be essential in minimizing the loss of 
life and economic damage which will follow one of these major attacks. I believe that it is of 
vital importance that future research on the subject focus on not only protecting urban 
support systems such as the electrical grid, potable water supply and essential facilities but 
also plan for the destruction or disturbance of these systems.  
Policy makers must also be aware of the evolving nature of terrorist’s tactics. Just as our 
sciences and experience evolve and improve so too will theirs. We must address the issues of 
protecting our urban support systems. These essentially consist of: the electrical grid, potable 
water supply, transportation networks and response services (police, fire etc.). Successful 
attacks on targets such as these achieve the main goals of terrorists in causing death, damage 
and fear but they also make the urban environment more vulnerable. This is especially 
important to consider in the light of mass, multi-coordinated attacks as seen in the attacks on 
the London’s underground and bus network. Disruption of the power supply could provide 
the necessary distraction and cover to carry out a very destructive and dangerous attack. One 
key point to be addressed is the necessity of auxiliary power for support services. Since the 
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majority of services run off the standard power grid a single blow to a junction station, power 
plant or other key piece of the grid could wipe out our ability to detect incoming threats, 
address poisoned water or coordinate operations such as police and hospital services. Much 
of our urban area’s vigilance relies on an uninterrupted power supply; disabling power to a 
major urban center will not only cause chaos, but also limit our ability to react to a more 
severe threat. Terrorist attacks on cities have required a stealthy and subtle approach in order 
to deliver explosives and chemical or biological packages to a site. Interruption of 
communication and visual aids would give a well organized terrorist cell the opportunity to 
deliver packages of significant destruction. It may also be prudent for policy makers to 
investigate the possibility of attacks on communication infrastructure such as cell phone 
towers and control stations. While there is little concern for loss of life around these assets it 
may be that their destruction is the beginning of a coordinated attack. If communications and 
lights are disabled in urban areas terrorists could have variable free range of a city.  
It may be that as terrorists study urban centers and find their weak points that they begin 
targeting life sustaining and economy sustaining infrastructure. Destruction of water and 
electrical infrastructure has been discussed above. However, decision makers must be aware 
of the aftermath effects of such attacks. Imagine a Québec winter with no electricity or 
Toronto’s Bay Street with no communication ability. Quick response is necessary, as well as 
recognition of natural and human conditions which may exacerbate the damage and chaos of 
a terrorist attack (Molotch and McClain, 2003).  
Policy makers must also be aware of our city’s inability to quarantine sections of urban areas 
and groups of people in the event of a chemical, biological or radiological attack. If carried 
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out successfully these types of attacks have a high degree of potential to kill or injure people 
especially in areas with a high population density. Many of these types of attacks especially 
biological weapons could rely on residents of a city as a delivery device. Since initial attacks 
panic and scatter people the potential to spread a communicable illness is limitless. In these 
cases disguise, reinforcement, and dispersion tactics will not be sufficient to prevent these 
attacks. It will require the outright prevention of an attack. Stopping a terrorist from 
deploying their device or completely containing the munitions, chemical etc. is the only sure 
way to stop these attacks. Mitigation of these forces should focus on stop tactics and in some 
cases deterrent and deflection tactics depending on the value of the asset.  
Much of the academic literate on the subject of anti-terrorism has focused on mitigating blast 
damage; however future events may see the rise in biological and chemical attacks as seen in 
the Tokyo subway saring gas attacks in 1995. In the event of these successful attacks our 
cities must be able to restrict the movement of residents and ensure that contamination does 
not spread. Limiting people’s ability to move in a city is a difficult issue with many 
calculated decisions. Major urban areas need the ability to suspend the movement of 
residents and visitors, preferably without impeding emergency services ability to perform 
their duties. Solid, built-in infrastructure for such an event will not be available for an entire 
city. It is also unlikely that a city’s streets could be secured effectively in a short period of 
time. It may be that a cities structures act as quarantine buildings in themselves. Since even 
the largest of towers have only a few exist near or below ground level it would be easier and 
more effective to prevent people from leaving a structure. This may require the reinforcing of 
doors and windows at lower heights; however, it is the most realistic and effective way to 
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contain people following an outbreak or contamination. Some minor emphasis on 
reinforcement tactics along with organization and fast implementation of stop tactics in the 
form of deployable barriers and security personnel may be the solution to effectively 
quarantining an urban population. This does however; leave the issue of people on the street. 
It would be necessary to guide them into nearby secure structures, using broaD.C.asts and 
emergency personnel. It is my belief that terrorist tactics will evolve in the future and that our 
urban support systems will become a target of advanced tactics and weapons. As such I 
believe that future research on defending these assents is necessary as well as preparing for 
their interruption or destruction and the quarantining of mass numbers of people in urban 
centers. My personal research and investigation will be on this topic as I continue my studies 
in the field of urban defense and terror mitigation.   
My research has found that planning policy will likely be largely unaffected by terrorist 
events around the world or even in Canada.  That is not to say that planning will not at all be 
affected by security concerns however municipal and regional planning policies will likely 
remain largely unaffected in the face of terrorism.  I believe this to be especially true if there 
is a relatively sporadic level of violence in urban areas associated with terrorism.   
Recommendations: Integrating the Planner into the Security Framework  
These recommendations are derived from the examination of the the role of the planner in the 
Canadian, American, British examples discussed in this Thesis.  They are built on the idea 
that traditional urban planners have a strong role to play in security planning and the overall 
safety of cities.  They are also derived from the policy changes implemented in the United 
States following September 11, 2001, namely that of municipalities taking a larger role in 
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implementing security driven changes to the built form of their cities.  Washington’s 
National Mall redesign provides an excellent example of this.  Additionally, these 
recommendations are drawn from the relatively low amount of activity and conversation 
surrounding terrorist threats in cities as well as from the absence of it in official and 
secondary plans of municipalities. 
As mentioned planners hold a unique position in the security network.  They have the 
position of being far enough removed from security concerns that they can weigh the 
consequences of actions or inaction with respect to security and are not so far removed that 
they cannot see the tangible benefits and necessity for planners to become involved in the 
security planning of their local areas.  In order for planners to become more involved in the 
security planning network it will likely be necessary that they force their way into the often 
closed door profession.  However it will be important for planners to analyze the effects 
which such an increase in professional scope can have on the urban fabric of localities and 
specifically on the urban form of cities as a consequence.  The planner is in a unique position 
in that he or she can better understands than most the consequences to urban form which 
increased security can have in a city and how that will affect the form of the city and 
consequently its economic, psychological and social condition.  This ability is the prime 
reason why planners need to be better included into the security planning dialogue.  If their 
opinions and analysis are taken seriously by higher level security agencies and higher levels 
of government they have the ability to act as a balancing force in the security industry which 
often sees safety as trumping almost all the factors of human life in cities.  I argue that while 
security concerns are paramount in cites the employment and creation of security systems in 
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urban areas must be done tactfully and with respect to the existing urban form, the urban 
form which is trying to be developed in the city and the economic, social and psychological 
conditions which exist.  Additionally the planner must determine if planning for security 
concerns such as terrorism is a progressive form of planning or simply an ineffective way at 
dealing with a social conditions rather than a technical problem which can be solved though 
effective management.  I argue that the issue intersects both spheres.  Siciliano and Rantisi in 
their forward of the 2007 Progressive Planning Journal demonstrates well the ambivalence 
which exists in the planning world when considering security planning in our urban areas in 
the post September 11
th
 world.     
“This issue of Progressive Planning examines the intersection of security and planning from 
a variety of perspectives. But rather than simply focus on whether or not security initiatives 
are effective planning tools the articles pivot on the question of why we have such security 
initiatives at all. This is an important distinction in an age where terrorism is perceived as a 
permanent condition that must be planned for and managed, not a problem that has emerged 
out of particular social conditions and historical relations. Indeed, terrorism is seen as a 
part of “everyday life” and just another “risk” to be planned for. Thus, technocratic 
solutions, often uncritically imported and adapted from defense planning at national levels, 
are promoted as the way to manage these risks, while more fundamental and structural 
issues of inequality and uneven development remain unchallenged”  
 
The two authors go on to demonstrate how security concerns in Canada are shifting land use 
issues to the security realm in the post 9/11 world and how this can impact urban form.  They 
state: 
Capitalist strategies of accumulation provide the social and economic context for security 
initiatives. Several contributions in this special issue address the role that planning plays in 
how space is restructured, governed and ‘secured’. Dorries, for example shows how a Six 
Nations protest over contested land on a residential subdivision in southern Ontario has 
been characterized as a security concern rather than a legitimate policy and planning issue 
by both the state as well as mainstream media. In attempts to provide credibility to this 
framing, the protesters in some instances are labeled as ‘terrorists’, to situate this event 
within dominant discourses of security in a post 9/11 world” 
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With restrictions on how space is governed and the intersections of security concerns with 
traditional land use concerns planners are inevitable going to find themselves dealing with 
security issues in the coming years.  This will be especially true of terrorist threats, either 
perceived or real if they come to be a part of everyday life in not only Canada but North 
America as a whole.  Despite the aforementioned ambivalence of planners to become 
involved in what some would deem to be outside of the realm of urban planning.  Despite 
ones views on the progression of planning and whether it should or should not interact with 
security planning issues related to terrorism and mass violence in cities the fact remains that 
security agencies have developed a strong presence in many cities and there is a belief that 
the threat of terrorism in cities is real.  These realizations should force planners to realize that 
if unchecked serious changes to urban form can arise.  History has demonstrated that mass 
violence has had little effect on the population of a city other than those who are killed in the 
violence and that actual violence will do little to affect the urban form of cities.  The response 
to that violence has the greatest impact on how the city functions and how urban form is 
affected by it.  If planners are unwilling to step into the realm of security planning they could 
be left out of the decision making situations which directly affect the form of cities actors 
Canada.  Therefore there must first be willingness on the side of planner to participate in the 
security planning conversation and force their way into the profession.  In order to force their 
way into the profession I believe that must take a more active role.  This would involve 
research on how security concerns are affecting the profession and cities.  Demonstrations of 
how security concerns have affected urban form, a greater emphasis on the subject in urban 
planning schools; even offering a sub specialty in the subject as has become common in other 
 
  118 
areas such as urban design, transportation planning, economic development, international 
development and others would encourage learning and conversation on the subject.  
Scholarly publications would also go far in legitimizing the planner as an effective member 
of the security team.  Practicing planners also have a great deal of influence on the subject.  
Including security concerns in the development of official plans or secondary plans would 
allow the concerns of planners regarding security concerns to seep into the collective 
profession and seeing as these plans are approved by higher levels of government, it would 
give a direct mandate to the municipal and regional planners who are so close to the ground.  
A combination of government mandates along with legitimizing the profession through 
academic channels would strongly develop the security aspects of urban planning especially 
in young planners making their way through universities.  From my research I have also 
noticed an aversion amongst planners to study topics which exist outside of the conventional 
planning policies or those which are emerging in schools.  In order to increase interest in the 
subject and have planners focus more attention on it, academics and practitioners will have to 
make it their business to bring the subject of security planning into the planning mainstream.   
Recommendations: 
My research has demonstrated that relatively little is being done at the municipal and 
regional level in order to prevent acts of mass violence.  The following recommendations are 
made in order to create more robust and prepared cities: 
1. The development of regional plans for terrorist attack mitigation through regional and 
municipal means 
2. The education of planners on the subject of security planning  
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3. A greater degree of internal cooperation on disaster mitigation and preparedness 
between provincial, regional and municipal levels of government, as well as the 
agencies within the umbrella organizations   
4. Provincial mandating, requiring official plans to address relevant security concerns in 
Canada’s urban areas similar to guidelines developed by the Department of 
Homeland Security in the United States 
5. Cities should develop site specific guidelines for structures and areas of importance to 
ensure adequate security measures are taken  
6. Complete risk analysis of municipality in order to allocate limited resources as 
necessary  
The completion and implementation of these strategies would better prepare Canadian cities 
for a variety of scenarios and increase their robustness.  Their implementation would 
opperationalize many of the principles and ideas being presented by leading planners and 
security planners in North America and around the world and would capitalize on the skills 
which planners and municipal officials bring to the security planning table.  It is therefore 
generally recommended that cities take greater initiative in their own protection and that 
planners force their way into the security profession for the benefit of their localities and the 
country as a whole.   
 
 




  121 
Appendix B Common Tactics used by Terrorists   
In light of the numerous and deadly terrorist attacks which are taking place around the globe 
it is necessary that urban areas be prepared to face the very real threat of a terrorist attack. 
The following chapter will provide a review of the tactics currently in place in many urban 
areas to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack and will supplement this with 
recommendations and advisory briefs on where urban protection needs to head in order to be 
effective and what is vulnerable in the urban environment. The purpose of this section is to 
provide an overview of standard practices in defending urban areas and more importantly to 
recognize deficiencies in urban defense and understand how to create an environment which 
is permanently guarded against threats but which stray’s away from the rings of steel and 
fortress architecture of the past. The following will assess the five types of defense tactics 
and their active and passive elements in conjunction with the spatial analysis of the three 
layers of defense. The combination of these three systems provides a comprehensive base of 
knowledge to understand how defensive strategists analyze the built environment and choose 
response measures to real or perceived threats. Knowledge of this area helps planners better 
understand the issues surrounding anti-terror planning and what in deficient or vulnerable in 
cities. 
Overview of the threat  
The nature of terrorism and explosive attacks grants attacking forces guaranteed success over 
time.  Law enforcement and active security must succeed 100% of the time against their 
terrorist enemies who only have to succeed once in order to accomplish their goal. This 
daunting task all but guarantees a successful terrorist attack on our cities. The goal of anti-
terror planning experts is make it as difficult as possible to carry out a successful terrorist 
attack and to dampen the effects of an attack when one occurs.  
Contemporary terrorist attacks take many forms and involve varying levels of expertise, 
planning and organization (Coaffe, 2010). They can be as simple as tossing a hand grenade 
into a shopping center or as complex and well thought out as the events of September 11, 
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2001. Despite their many forms they can be generalized into four main categories, none of 
which are mutually exclusive of one another.  
Small arms attack/ urban warfare  
Example: Mumbai India November 29, 2008  
These attacks are fast paced in execution but often drawn-out over time. They often involve 
siege style attacks on urban centers such as the attack seen in Mumbai India in 2008. This 
style of attack usually targets people or structures of significance in urban areas. The goal is 
often the elimination of a single high profile target or the seizure of structural assets in order 
to strike fear into people. The attacks in Mumbai India targeted high profile hotels which 
housed a variety of people from around the world. Their bloody nature and targeting of 
foreigners may be seen as an attempt to discourage travel and foreign influence.  
Explosive attacks  
Examples: Oklahoma City Bombing April 19, 1995  
Explosive attacks aim to cause as much damage and loss of life as possible in a localized 
area. Since it is often difficult to accumulate enough explosives in an area to do cause mass 
damage and destruction with single explosion terrorists often target portions of structures 
which will cause a great amount of collateral damage from building collapse or falling 
debris. The Oklahoma city bombing in 1995 which killed 168 people and injured 680 more, 
is an example of a well planned and executed urban explosive attack. The explosion itself 
killed few people; however, the progressive building collapse which followed crushed many 
people resulting in a large loss of life.  
Chemical and biological attacks  
Examples: Sarin gas attack, Tokyo subway March 20, 1995 
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Due to their nature chemical attacks are among the most difficult to prevent. They are 
however among the most difficult to execute as well. Chemical or biological attacks can take 
a variety of forms from anthrax powder in envelopes as was the case in the United States to 
the release of nerve agents as witnessed in the Tokyo subway attacks in 1995. Chemical and 
biological attacks are most effective when deployed indoors (generally speaking) poor air 
circulation and large numbers of people in close quarters make ideal targets for chemical and 
biological attacks (DHS, Biological attack 2004, DHS, Chemical Attack 2004). They can be 
delivered in a variety of forms from inhaled poisons to contagious pathogens. Unlike many 
other attacks bio-chemical attacks require rare material and scientific expertise in order to 
effectively create and deploy a successful attack. Since chemicals and biohazards can be 
hidden in small quantities and in many cases are not detectible by conventional security 
systems, effective response measures are necessary to combat this threat. These can range 
from quarantine strategies to installation of advanced HAVC systems to filter air.  
Nuclear/Radiological attacks  
Among the most potentially devastating, nuclear and radiological attacks have the ability to 
cause mass damage and destruction to urban areas in a matter of seconds. Not all radiological 
threats come in the form of a nuclear bomb. Since material and proper expertise to fabricate 
and transport an appropriately seized nuclear device is rare, I believe that it is far more likely 
for a dirty bomb attacks to take place. The threat of a nuclear bomb exploding in an urban 
area is real; however there are virtually no defense mechanisms which can be implemented to 
prepare a city for such an attack. Prevention is the only option in this case. This involves a 
sophisticated network of tracking, intelligence and technology devices capable of detecting a 
nuclear threat before it reaches its target. With respect to the far more likely scenario of a 
dirty bomb attack however, responsive measures can be established in order to mitigate the 
effects of such a device. For all intensive purposes a dirty bomb is simply a piece of 
dangerously radioactive material combined with an explosive. The explosion shatters the 
material creating a radioactive dust or cloud (DHS, Radiological Attack 2004, DHS Nuclear 
Attack 2005). The cloud, while extremely dangerous has mostly local effects and will not 
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severely damage the build environment or cause mass death like a nuclear bomb. In the event 
of a dirty bomb explosion immediate response is necessary. This involves planning for 
medical emergencies which are likely to follow; ensuring hospitals are stocked with radiation 
medication and having a trained and rapidly deployable hazardous material response units. 
Radiological attacks unlike siege or explosive attacks cannot be easily defended against by 
altering the built environment; it is largely in the hands of human beings. Detection and 
prevention are the best mitigation methods.  
While all types of terrorist attacks are dangerous and aimed at destroying lives and property 
the most common and often most effective attack has been explosive attacks (Coaffee, 2009). 
The widespread availability of explosive material combined with the advent of mass numbers 
of suicide bombers has made explosive attacks the deadliest form of terrorism across the 
world.  In combating these dangers many issues have arisen with respect to the changes in 
urban form which develop.  They are explored in greater detail in the following section. 
Review of anti-terror tactics  
The following section will describe the different tactics used to mitigate terrorist attacks in 
urban areas. The focus has been placed on explosive attacks due to their frequent nature as 
described above however; many of the tactics can be universally applied.  
Stop tactics  
Goal of Stop Tactics: to completely protect all assets and structures inside a designated 
perimeter with passive physical barriers and active defense.  
Stop tactics matrix rating: level 1:  
Can be rapidly deployed within a short period of time.  
Within minutes security and response personnel can be at a scene or intercept a would-be 
attacker before an attack is executed.  
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Physical barriers can be in place shortly thereafter usually within 1-2 hours of an event or 
quickly beforehand if a threat is detected permanent long term options available.  
Unlike other forms of mitigation stop tactics aim is to prevent would be attackers or their 
munitions from reaching their target. Successfully planning an area to prevent an explosive 
attack from occurring involves careful examination of the three layers of defense beginning 
with the first layer. Stop tactics are in many ways the traditional form of anti-terror 
mitigation. They aim to solidify standoff distance and make it as difficult as possible to harm 
to an asset. In the event of an explosive attack stop tactics aim to absorb blast damage with 
barriers and prevent explosives from reaching their intended target. When confronted with 
chemical and biological threats the goal of stop tactics is simply to prevent intruders from 
breaching the protected barrier and draw attention to those who are attempting to intrude and 
do harm. When combined with security personnel the systems described below can effective 
prevent a terrorist attack or foil it by wasting its munitions on nonliving, non-vital systems 
such as physical barriers and open space.  
Deterrent/deflection tactics:  
Goal of Deterrent and Deflection Tactics: The goal of these types of tactics is to put forth an 
obvious display of strength and protection in order to deter a would-be attack from 
attempting to destroy an asset.  
Deterrent and deflection tactics matrix rating level 2:  
Some aspects of this defense are rapidly deployable such as mass numbers of security 
personnel. However, to more fully deter an attack a formidable display of force is necessary 
and therefore takes longer to deploy.  
Jersey barriers and sandbags can be in place within hours and personnel within minutes. 
Fully secured structures can takes months to years of planning and implementation in cases 
where long-term deterrents are necessary.  
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By making obvious displaces of strength, protection and resilience terrorist attacks are 
discouraged by either the difficulty of successfully bombing a target or by the likelihood that 
they will be caught. This type of tactic is best reserved for the most precious assets. The 
nature of deflection and deterrent tracts simply discourages attackers from attempting to 
destroy the structure; consequently it deflects their attention elsewhere. The result is that a 
successful display of force and protection causes terrorist to pick a weaker target. Since this 
type of anti-terror defense does not cause terrorist to be caught or fail in their actions but 
simply encourages them to go elsewhere it is best reserved for targets which are not 
expendable.  
Deterrent and deflection tactics can vary in type and design and can include both active and 
passive defense systems. Those who aim to deliver destructive devices to an asset will 
evaluate their target before acting. Making overt displays of strength can discourage terrorists 
from targeting a given asset. Examples can be seen around the world, but are usually 
reserved for military instillations and government operations centers. Cheyenne Mountain, 
Fort Knox and the White House provide excellent examples of structures which employ 
deterrent and deflection tactics to prevent an attack on them. Since they are considered so 
secure and their content is so highly valued it has been deemed necessary to offer them an 
unprecedented level of protection. Assets such as these usually employ security personnel 
both visible and hidden to deter and prevent an attack. Since people can react and be trained 
to recognize elements which do not belong as well as react to a situation their usefulness in 
protecting an asset is unparalleled. However, people make mistakes, can be bribed, coerced 
or killed. Passive elements such as walls, fences, razor wire and the like are fool proof. While 
they can be destroyed and bypassed they still deter potential attackers by lowering the chance 
of success.  
Dispersion tactics  
Goals of Dispersion tactics: to prevent destruction of an entire system by separating its 
individual elements  
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Dispersion tactics matrix rating level 3:  
Requires months to years of planning to create a secure and disperse facility. However it is 
possible to erect a functional facility in the form of tents and mobile operations vehicles 
within days and even hours if resources are rapidly available.  
This form of mitigation seeks to place potential targets as far apart from each other as 
possible to reduce damage to multiple units. By taking targets of inertest and placing them far 
away from other structures the risk of a catastrophe is reduced. The potential target can also 
be dispersed into many different areas so that an attack against it would never do any 
significant damage. This tactics seeks to compartmentalize targets and damage preventing the 
complete destruction of an asset. This tactic does not work well in cities where structures are 
tightly packed together and separation of a single target into smaller, separate units is not 
possible. Structures which have employed this tactic include the Pentagon as well as most air 
and naval bases. Separating critical systems prevents collapse of the entire system as a whole. 
This is vitally important for military instillations and government structures and is one of the 
main reasons that they are few tall, tower like military and government buildings. The 
vulnerability of these types of structures to progressive collapse, (which is often the largest 
cause of death and damage caused by an explosive attack) makes them unsuitable for these 
purposes. Dense urban areas often do not have the luxury of dispersing their contents over a 
large area as such some important assets which choose to locate themselves in a large tower 
may separate their individual departments or assets, placing them in various parts of the 
structure to minimize the potential that a single attack could destroy all of the protected 
assets. While explosive attacks may or may not destroy the entire structure, this tactic may be 
more useful in the event of a chemical or biological attack aimed at an asset contained in a 
large structure.  
Reinforcement tactics  
Goal of Reinforcement Tactics: These tactics simply harden structures physical properties 
making them more difficult to destroy. The goal is to absorb blast energy and protect vital 
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parts and systems of a structure to minimize damage in the event of a successful attack and to 
prevent progressive collapse.  
Reinforcement tactics matrix rating level 4:  
Requires months to years of structural reinforcement and pre construction preparation as well 
as many skilled and educated individuals to analyze and investigate best methods of 
approach.  
Key elements of reinforcement tactics:  
-Design key structural elements to withstand the effects of a severe blast  
-Design structures to withstand localized structural failures without causing progressive 
collapse  
-Reinforce vulnerable sections of structural support  
-Limit column spacing  
-Select explosive resistant materials                                     
                                                                        
The goal of reinforcement tactics is not to prevent an attack from occurring but rather to have 
structures withstand the brunt of an explosion and remain functional and relatively 
undamaged. This is not to say that a structure will be completely unfazed by a large 
explosion. Reinforcement tactics aim to ensure that there is no collapse of the structure which 
often leads to far more deaths then the actual explosion, that there are redundant structural 
systems in place, so that the structure can redistribute the weight of itself in the event that a 
key support is destroyed.  
A major focus of reinforcement tactics is to ensure that localized damage will not 
compromise the integrity of the entire structure. Since blast rapidly dissipates with distance it 
is extremely important that the local effects of a blast do not affect the overall support 
systems of a structure. Structures, especially their outer frames should be designed accept 
localized failure without initiating progressive collapse (FEMA 427, 2003). Collapse in 
structures causes far more loss of life than explosive damage does, terrorists know this and 
will target structural elements in order to topple buildings (FEMA 427, 2003).  
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Disguise tactics:  
Goals of Disguise tactics:  
-mask vulnerable parts of structures,  
-make resilient parts of structures seem weak  
-Create decoy parts of a structure which have no real value but appear to be easy targets to 
strike.  
 
Disguise tactics matrix rating level 5:  
Months to years of planning and construction to fully implement successful disguise tactics 
on structures in urban centers as well as many skilled and educated individuals to analyze 
and investigate best methods of approach.  
These tactics aim to mitigate the damage caused by a carried out attack. There is no emphasis 
placed on preventing the actual attack from occurring but rather the goal of such tactics is to 
ensure that the energy released by an explosive attack is wasted. These forms of blast 
mitigation are excellent for structures which are currently in place. They allow structures to 
be retrofitted to prevent their complete destruction. Similar to the previously mentioned 
deterrent and deflection tactics, disguise tactics aim to alter the location that a blast or attack 
will occur in order to waist its energy. This tactic often employs architectural disguise in 
order to achieve its goals. Tactics such as artificially widening pillars to make them appear 
more difficult to destroy, creating seemingly unguarded targets of opportunity which have no 
structural value, creating large seemingly important areas where blast damage would rapidly 
dissipate or large approach section to structures such as covered car ports, and unused 
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Appendix C Canadian Federal Government Responses to Terrorist 
Threats 
Federal government responses to the threat of terrorism in Canada have been different from 
those found in the United States.  One of the main body which manages disasters in Canada 
and ensures preparedness, Public Safety Canada provides an excellent example and 
comparison agency to similar federal agency in the United States such as the Federal 
Emergency management Agency FEMA.  Following September 11, 2001 the Government of 
Canada restricted the Canadian federal emergency agencies and created Public Safety 
Canada (PSC, 2012). The mandate of the organization is to prepare and respond to various 
disasters which can affect the Canadian population.  Unlike FEMA however PSC has not 
released the same volume of publications nor the same type of publications as its United 
States Counterparts.  While high level broad scale thinking between the two organizations 
has similarities in goal statements, overall objectives and the like way in which they 
communicate to lower level governments and the information they provide is strikingly 
different.  With respect to the effects on local anti-terrorism planning and security FEMA has 
published what it calls the Risk Management Series.  The publications outline specific 
strategies which can be used on small scales to prevent and mitigate the effects of terrorist 
attacks in the city. Such local level recommendations are not present in readily available 
Canadian policy or publications. This is not to say that FEMA material is not relevant to 
Canadian cities but it demonstrates the difference in federal thinking and the role the federal 
government sees municipalities making the in the defense against potential terrorist attacks.  
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However this is not to say that the Canadian government has not made contributions toward 
the safety of its citizens in urban areas.     
Since September 11, 2001 the Canadian Government has taken a variety of steps to further 
increase the security of the nation.  Major initiatives include;  
 the creation of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority which is responsible 
for screening baggage and passengers. 
 Broadened information security sharing among Canadian security agencies to prevent 
the financing of terrorist activity 
 Created the Canada Border Service Agency with increased information sharing and 
enhanced cooperation between international agencies as well as armed the 5685 front 
lien Canada Border Service Agency Officers 
 Created Canada Command which coordinates military resources for domestic security 
 Brought into law the Anti-terrorism Act which has had 26 people charged under it 
thus far with 14 convictions  
 Created mechanisms to identify individuals or groups who are associated with 
terrorism and compiled a list of 44 groups which are identified as terrorist entities 
under the Criminal Code  
 Redeployment of 2000 federal police officers to national security duties  
 Creation of special cabinet committee on security and anti-terrorism formed under 
Chrétien government  
Other changes following September 11, 2001 have also been made to protect the health and 
safety of Canadian.  The Transportations of Dangerous Goods Act is one such representation.  
Changes have forced rail carriers to reevaluate how and where dangerous goods are 
transposed resulting in new management practices which prevent rail cars bearing dangerous 
goods from being in too close proximity to one another and new mandates on the type of rail 
cars which can be used for the transportation of dangerous goods.  The Federal government 
of Canada’s actions following the September 11, 2001 attacks number more than those listed 
and explained above.  Appendix C provides a larger list of initiatives taken and polices 
enacted in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001.   
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Appendix D: Canadian Anti-terrorism Initiatives 
The following appendix is taken from the Government of Canada website and represents 
listed initiatives taken to protect Canada following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
It was last updated in February 2003.  It can be accessed via the following link 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/canadaactions-en.asp 
Backgrounder: Canada's Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11 
The Government of Canada acted swiftly in response to the September 11 attacks and to the 
global threat of terrorism. 
Within 45 minutes of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., Canada 
began accepting 224 diverted planes and more than 33 000 passengers and aircrew in airports 
across the country. In small communities like Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador, 12 000 
people were accommodated, although the local population is only 10 000. 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien established the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security 
and Anti-Terrorism, chaired by John Manley, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to review 
policies, legislation, regulations and programs across the Government to strengthen all 
aspects of Canada's approach to fighting terrorism and ensuring public security. 
The Government of Canada quickly implemented its Anti-Terrorism Plan, with five clear 
objectives: 
1. to prevent terrorists from getting into Canada; 
2. to protect Canadians from terrorist acts; 
3. to bring forward tools to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists; 
4. to keep the Canada-U.S. border secure and open to legitimate trade; and 
5. to work with the international community to bring terrorists to justice and address the 
root causes of terrorism. 
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The Government of Canada is supporting this plan by introducing strong new legislation and 
investing $7.7 billion to fight terrorism and reinforce public security. 
Putting More People, Technology and Capacity in Place 
 Canada invested $280 million in immediate measures -- such as enhanced policing, 
security and intelligence -- in the wake of September 11. 
Key initiatives included:  
 fast-tracking a fraud-resistant Permanent Resident Card for new immigrants; 
 more front-end security screening for refugee claimants; 
 increased detention capacity; 
 increased deportation activity; 
 hiring of new staff to enforce upgraded security at ports of entry; 
 redeployment of over 2000 federal police officers to national security duties; 
 technology upgrades, equipment purchases and training to increase capacity to: 
 prevent, detect and respond to existing and emerging threats to national security; 
 share information among criminal justice and other agencies; and 
 undertake coordinated domestic and international law enforcement responses and 
target cross-border criminal activity; 
 purchases of antibiotics to increase the national emergency stockpile system; 
 purchases of sensors and detection and other equipment and enhancements for the 
national network of laboratories. 
Budget 2001 builds on these initiatives through a comprehensive set of measures designed to 
keep Canada safe, keep terrorists out and keep our border open. It provides a total of $7.7 
billion over the next five years to enhance security for Canadians and make Canada's borders 
more secure, open and efficient. The Budget includes major investments to:  
 equip and deploy more intelligence and front-line investigative personnel, improve 
coordination among agencies and boost marine security($1.6 billion); 
 improve screening of immigrants, refugee claimants and visitors (including detention 
and removals), for the quicker determination of refugee claims and for new fraud-
resistant Permanent Resident Cards ($1 billion); 
 improve critical infrastructure protection, emergency preparedness and response and 
expand anti-terrorism capacity for the military ($1.6 billion); 
 create a new air security organization, assign armed undercover police officers on 
Canadian aircraft, purchase explosives detection equipment and enhance policing 
($2.2 billion); and 
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 enhance border security and improve the infrastructure that supports major border 
crossings to ensure the legitimate flow of goods and people ($1.2 billion). 
 Canada and the United States have increased vigilance regarding North American 
airspace through our joint participation in NORAD (the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command). Canada has made available additional CF-18 fighter jets to 
patrol our shared airspace. 
Preventing Illegal Migration and Efficiently Managing Legitimate Travel 
Canada and the United States place the highest priority on ensuring our borders are safe and 
efficient in order to facilitate the $1.9 billion in daily trade across our shared border. 
On December 3, 2001, the governments of Canada and the United States signed a Joint 
Statement of Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues. Canadian and 
American efforts will focus on deterrence, detection and prosecution of security threats, the 
disruption of illegal migration and the efficient management of legitimate travel through:  
 integrating Canadian officials on the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force; 
 reviewing visitor visa policy; 
 developing joint units to assess information on incoming air passengers; 
 increasing the number of Immigration Control Officers overseas; 
 developing common biometric identifiers for documents; 
 developing a Safe Third Country Agreement; 
 expanding the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams; and 
 reinvigorating Project North Star. 
 Placing Immigration Control Officers overseas is a unique Canadian approach, which 
has been successfully adopted by others, to stop terrorists, criminals and other 
undesirables. In the past six years, Canadian immigration control officers abroad have 
stopped more than 33 000 people with false documents before they boarded planes 
for North America (over 6000 this year alone). 
 The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams target cross-border crime through an 
integrated law enforcement approach that brings together agencies at all levels in 
Canada and their U.S. counterparts. 
Strengthening Laws 
The Government of Canada has introduced key pieces of legislation. 
The Anti-Terrorism Act, introduced on October 15, includes measures designed to:  
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 identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists; 
 provide new investigative tools to law enforcement and national security agencies; 
and 
 ensure that Canadian values of respect and fairness are preserved through stronger 
laws against hate crimes and propaganda. 
Measures include: 
 defining and designating terrorist groups and activities; 
 tougher sentences for terrorism offences; 
 making it a crime to knowingly participate in, facilitate or contribute to a terrorist 
group; 
 making it a crime to knowingly collect or give funds in order to carry out terrorism; 
 making it easier to use electronic surveillance against terrorist groups; and 
 within carefully defined limits, allowing the arrest and detention of, and imposition of 
conditions of release on, suspected terrorists to prevent terrorist acts and save lives. 
Canada has ratified 10 of the 12 counterterrorism conventions of the United Nations. The 
new Anti-Terrorism Act will allow Canada to ratify the remaining two. 
The Public Safety Act, introduced on November 22, will amend some 18 federal laws to 
further strengthen the Government's ability to protect Canadians, prevent terrorist attacks and 
respond swiftly if a significant threat should arise. Highlights include: 
 security requirements for the design or construction of aircraft, airports and facilities; 
 screening people and goods entering restricted areas; 
 making it an offence to engage in any behaviour that endangers the safety or security 
of a flight or persons on board; 
 requiring air carriers or those operating aviation reservation systems to provide basic 
information on specific passengers or flights when it is needed for security purposes; 
and 
 amendments to the Immigration Act to speed implementation of measures, including:  
 suspending or terminating refugee determination proceedings if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the claimant is a terrorist, senior official of a government 
engaged in terrorism or a war criminal; 
 denying wanted persons the ability to evade justice by going to a country of their 
choice rather than to the country where they are wanted; 
 imposing stiff increases in penalties for people smuggling; and 
 giving immigration officers the authority to arrest and detain foreign nationals in 
Canada who are unable to satisfactorily identify themselves. 
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In addition, amendments to the Aeronautics Act will maximize the effectiveness of the 
aviation security system and ensure that Canada continues to have one of the safest aviation 
systems in the world. 
Rooting out Terrorists and Their Networks 
Canadian law enforcement, security and intelligence organizations are collaborating and 
actively participating in the largest international investigation in history to root out and 
dismantle terrorist support networks in all their forms, wherever they exist. 
Canada acted swiftly in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to freeze the assets 
of those who commit or facilitate terrorist acts and to prohibit the provision and collection of 
funds for terrorist activities. Canadian financial institutions have frozen the $344 000 
associated with the 100 individuals and groups designated under the United Nations 
Suppression of Terrorism Regulations. 
The Government has invested an additional $63 million since September 11 in the Financial 
Transaction Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) to expand its capacity to stop 
possible funding of terrorists. 
Military Contribution 
Canada committed direct military support for the U.S.-led international campaign against 
terrorism. The Government of Canada has contributed the following resources to the 
Canadian operation, known as Operation Apollo: 
 2000 Canadian men and women of the Canadian Forces; 
 a Canadian Naval Task Group (two frigates, a destroyer and a supply ship), which is 
on station in the Arabian Sea; 
 another Canadian frigate, which is integrated with a U.S. Carrier Battle Group; 
 Canadian aircraft to conduct airlifts in the region; and 
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 a 1000-strong light infantry unit, which is on seven days notice for possible 
deployment within an international stabilization force. 
Diplomatic Activities and Humanitarian Aid 
Canada is working with other countries, individually and multilaterally, to broaden the 
coalition to fight terrorism and to foster the establishment of a broadly representative, 
accountable, stable, inclusive and multi-ethnic administration and government in Afghanistan 
and aid in the reconstruction of that country. 
Canada is uniquely positioned as a member of the G8, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization), the United Nations, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, the Organization 
of American States -- among other international organizations -- to advance the anti-terrorism 
agenda; it also participates at nearly every summit and important international gathering. 
Canada has provided $16 million in emergency assistance to Afghanistan since September 
11. This is in addition to the more than $12 million contributed this year prior to the crisis 
and the more than $160 million provided over the past 10 years. 
APPENIX 6 Tourist population-Temporary Population 
Historical evidence, as well as more recent terrorist attacks in the 1990s and 2000s, 
demonstrates that the tourist population of a city dramatically decreases when there is a 
perceived threat of violence (Llorca-Vivero, 2007).   Tourist populations can greatly 
contribute to the economic success of cities and help develop the local urban form.  Hotels, 
convention centers, stadiums, resorts and other tourist infrastructure. are all geared toward 
the tourist population and the profits which are generated from this transient population  The 
interruption of a flow of tourist populations to an urban destination via terrorism can have a 
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profound effect on the future develop of an area and therefore its urban form.  As Llorca-
Vivero (2007) states: 
“One of the more evident consequences of terrorist attacks in a specific country is that 
people may perceive this country to be risky. Therefore, apart from the direct destruction of 
infrastructures or the existence of victims, uncertainty seems to be a key element of the 
indirect cost associated to this phenomenon. This may be particularly true for tourism.” 
(Llorca-Vivero, 2007 p171).   
Recent research by Coshall (2005) has demonstrated that tourist populations tend to rebound 
more quickly than was first thought.  This is encouraging considering the implications which 
a laggings tourist population can have on the economic growth of an area.  Additionally, the 
effects of tourism can affect local urban form by way of stagnating the population growth 
often associated with tourist destinations.  However when tourists are directly targeted the 
rebound of the tourist population may not be as rapid, although evidence of this causational 
relationship is difficult to obtain.  Keeping this in mind it is important to also realize that the 
nature of the local area is also very important in determining if an act of terrorism will 
specifically target tourists.  As Lepp and Gibson (2003) explain citing Aziz (1995): 
“One of the most infamous acts of terrorism against tourists occurred in Egypt in 1997 when 
gunmen killed 71 tourists outside of Luxor. Indeed, tourists are often the specific targets of 
terrorist organizations. In Egypt” (Lepp & Gibson, 2003 p 607), Aziz (1995) explained 
tourism has come to represent capitalism and conspicuous consumption and an attack on 
tourists signifies ideological opposition to these western values” (Aziz, 1995 p 23).   
Therefore when considering the Canadian context, the nature of multiculturalism in Canada 
and regional differences, attacks specifically targeting tourists may not be as likely however, 
as stated an attack of any kind can dramatically affect the perceived threat of a terrorist attack 
and therefore the volume of tourists which a city receives.  Additionally Studies by Mullins 
1991, 1994 found that cities characterized by having large tourist populations and supporting 
industry experienced rapid population growth, rapid employment growth and a large class of 
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self employed people.  These demographic characteristics can affect the way in which cities 
form and how land use planning is conducted.  The interruption of this industry by terrorists 
over a long period can significantly change the urban form of a city.  This becomes 
especially true when tourist capital investments are destroyed by terrorists seeing as not all 
tourist destinations are ‘sun and sea’ destinations.  The information provided on populations 
can directly reflect how planning is conducted in cities especially with when allocating 
resources.  It also demonstrates another area of condition for urban planning when thinking 
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Appendix E Key Search Terms and Databases 
1. Active defense   
2. Anti-terrorism  
3. Anti-terrorism planning 
4. Biodefense   
5. Blast mitigation  
6. Canadian anti-terrorism planning  
7. Canadian security planning  
8. Cities and warfare  
9. Corporate agglomeration  
10. Corporate security  
11. Counter terrorism  
12. Defensive Cities  
13. Emergency management  
14. Force protection  
15. GIS terrorism Modeling  
16. Homeland security  
17. Infrastructure hardening  
18. Layered defense 
19. NBC threats  
20. Passive defense 
21. Perceived risk  
22. Resilience  
23. Risk management  
24. Security and design  
25. Security planning  
26. Smart growth  
27. Target hardening  
28. Terror resistance 
29. Terrorism  
30. Terrorism management  
31. Terrorism response management  
32. Terrorism response planning  
33. Terrorist mitigation  
34. Terrorist target selection  
35. Urban anti-terrorism planning 
36. Urban defense  
37. Urban IED threats  
38. Urban resilience  
39. Urban security  
40. Urban sprawl  
41. Urban terror 
42. Urban VBIED threats  
 
Key Research Databases used: 
1. American City  
2. Annals of Regional Science  
3. Annals of Tourism Research  
4. Avery Index to Architectural 
Periodicals  
5. British Journal of Criminology 
6. Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation   
7. Canadian Journal of Urban 
Research  
8. Canadian Journal of Urban 
Research  
9. Defense and Peace Economics  
10. Economic Policy Review  
11. Federal Emergency management 
Agency  
12. Geobase 
13. Housing and Policy Debate  
14. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research  
15. International Political Sociology 
16. International Relations 
17. Journal of American Planning 
association 
18. Journal of Infrastructure Systems  
19. Journal of Monetary Economics  
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20. Journal of the American Institute 
of Planners 
21. Journal of the American Planning 
Association 
22. Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research  
23. Journal of Urban Economics  
24. Local Environment  
25. Municipal Engineer 
26. National Academic Press 
27. New York Times 
28. Political Research Quarterly 
29. Princeton Architectural Press 
30. Progressive Planning Journal  
31. Public Administration Review 
32. Security Dialogue 
33. Social Science Computer Review  
34. Terrorism and Political Violence  
35. the Institution of Civil Engineers- 
36. Theory Culture & Society 
37. Theory, Culture and Society 
38. Transportation Research 
Information Service  
39. Urban Affairs  
40. Urban Affairs Review  
41. Urban and Regional research 
42. Urban Design and Planning  
43. Urban Land Institute  
44. Washington D.C. Center for 
immigration Studies 
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